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WHITE RACISM & WORLD SPORT

ISRAEL: AFRICA'S FRIEND OR FOE?

samuel ben adam

LENIN'S FIRST NEWSPAPER

d. ivon jones

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David Ivon Jones

D. Ivon Jones was one of the founders, with W.H.Andrews and S.P.Bunting, of the International Socialist League of South Africa in 1915. An outstanding Marxist theoretician, he worked on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. This article, published on the occasion of Lenin's death in 1924, was one of the first to explain for English-speaking readers the outstanding role played by V.I.Lenin in establishing the Bolshevik Party, of his newspaper Iskra, *and of his famous work* What Is to be Done*—not at that time available in English.*

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Editorial Notes:

S. A. RACIALISM AND WORLD SPORT

So far 1970 has been a particularly bad year for the South African racists in their efforts to continue imposing their unrepresentative all-white teams upon the playing fields of international sport. They have been ousted from the Davis Cup Tennis tournament. At long last they have been expelled by the International Olympic Committee. And—perhaps the bitterest blow so far—mass presure in Britain, and from the African, Asian and Caribbean Commonwealth members, forced the last-minute cancellation of their cricket tour of England.

In each case these decisions were forced upon reluctant sports administrators in the West after prolonged campaigns by the 'non-European' and socialist countries, by democratic and working class movements in West Europe and North America, and not least by the liberation movements and non-white sportsmen of South Africa itself.

The most tortuous and complicated arguments were advanced by those who want, for whatever reason to preserve the claims of the white minority to be the sole representatives of South Africa in sport (as in everything else.) We were told that the whites' addiction to apartheid (which most of those opposing the sports boycott profess to 'detest') would not be diminished but perhaps stiffened if their teams were kept out, a dubious and irrelevant proposition.

The principle at issue, however, is quite simple. Once you admit the 'right' of white South African to export apartheid in the shape of colourbar sports teams you are in fact condoning and fortifying white domination in sports and every other field as well.

No amount of wriggling by the South African sports and other authorities and their foreign sympathisers can conceal or evade this blunt reality. Nor can their grudging and phoney 'concessions' alter the basic principle.

Having refused for many years to consider issuing visas for non-white sportsmen, as in the recent cases of D'Oliviera and the American tennis champion Arthur Ashe, the South African government has now agreed that they will kindly permit the New Zealand Rugby Union to include a few Maoris in their team. But the 'All Blacks' as the New Zealand team is called will be playing the 'All Whites'. Not a single African, Coloured or Indian player could by any remote stretch of the imagination be considered to join any team they will meet. By agreeing to meet them on such terms they are allowing the claim of the white fifteen to represent 'South Africa'—a gross insult to the 17 million South Africans who cannot take part, and for that matter to the people of New Zealand who properly consider that merit, not skin-colour is the criterion for selection in the national team. Similarly, the promise to consider non-whites for the Olympic team is an empty one. No doubt, despite the abject lack of facilities for non-white sport, not a few non-members of the master race would qualify for a national team, if it were fairly chosen. But since the chosing would be done by the whites, and since no open-racial trials are possible in South Africa, it could not be fairly chosen.

'Keep politics out of sport' has been one of the favourite slogans of those who want to keep the white South Africans in world sport. But apartheid politics which govern every facet of South African life, and which have absolutely nothing in common with sportsmanship or fairplay, are as inseparable from athletics and games as they are from every other aspect of life in our unhappy country Indeed the pretence that this is purely an issue for sportsmen and sports administrators, and has nothing to do with 'politics' is rapidly being swept away in the high winds of healthy controversy in the campaign to boycott the South African All-Whites.

In this respect the victorious campaign to stop the cricket tour of Britain is highly instructive. It has rapidly boiled up into a major political issue on the eve of the crucial general election under way in Britain at the time when these Notes are being written.

Great credit is due to the 'Stop the Tour' Committee, uniting the forces of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and other British friends of South African freedom, whose imaginative and militant campaigning did so much to provide means of effective protest for those who felt outraged and ashamed at the invitation to the white cricketers.

Tribute must also be paid to the African, Caribbean and Asian Commonwealth countries whose decisions to boycott the Edinburgh Games if the tour went on were an important factor in bringing home to Britain the strength and depth of their feelings against apartheid.

But it would be a great mistake to believe that these pressures alone would have brought the British Government to act as it did and virtually order the diehards of the Cricket Council to cancel their invitation. This is what they and Vorster combine in calling 'yielding to blackmail'—as if to yield to mass pressure, legally and democratically exercised for a progressive purpose can possibly be called blackmail. Of course Vorster considers any demands by non-whites and their friends as 'blackmail. He has his own ideas as to how such demands should be answered, as demonstrated at Sharpeville and numerous similar occasions.

The plain fact however is that the tour could not and would not have been called off were it not that the campaign against it enjoyed the overwhelming support of the great majority of progressive and democratic people in Britain: the Labour and trade union movement, the Liberal and Church leaders, practically the entire student movement.

The Cricket Council itself—before their final surrender, and while still doggedly persisting in their intention, despite everything, to go on with the tour—conceded the moral and political bankruptcy of their case by promising that 'this would be the last' invitation to an all-white South African side. This damaging admission brought about their defeat. For if such tours would be wrong in principle in the future they are wrong now: their undertaking irresistibly recalled the drunkard who promises that 'this will be the last' spree.

The Cricket Council has properly become the target of the healthy anti-racialist and democratic forces in Britain and in a sense not undeservedly so, for it has long been a stronghold of those—like the dying aristocrats of the IOC—who live in or dream nostalgically of a return to a world where sport, like all other leisure pursuits were the virtual monopoly of the 'Western' nations, and among them, for that matter, of the gentry and men of means.

But it would be superficial merely to consider this clash as one of the sports administrators vs. the Rest. Behind the apparently purposeless obduracy of the cricket chiefs were and are aligned immensely influential and powerful forces in British public life. They are neither foolish nor purposeless. Their determination to maintain and strengthen every possible link with the fascist Republic of South Africa is based on naked greed and self-interest. Whatever the cost in human lives and suffering, they are out to continue and increase their vast profits from their Southern African investments—i.e. to maintain their partnership with Vorster and his Nazi thugs in the merciless exploitation of African labour and natural resources.

The political instrument of this formidable 'South Africa lobby' in Britain is the Conservative Party. According to the recently published brochure *South Africa, Apartheid and Britain* issued jointly by the Labour Research Department and the African National Congress, at least 32 of its MP's (or one in ten) are directors of companies with subsidiaries in South Africa—and these have 48 such directorships between them. A number of them are in the Tory Shadow Cabinet, including Quintin Hogg, Robert Carr, Anthony Barber, Reginald Maulding, Earl Jellicoe, Geoffrey Rippon, Lord Carrington and Peter Walker.

Interesting indeed, as showing the intimate links between British and South African Big Business and the Conservative Party is the revelation in this brochure that well over half the total amount of recorded political donations (to the Conservative Party and its associates) have been made by companies with South African subsidiaries.

What has all this to do with cricket tour? A great deal. For the men who dominate cricket and other sports—like their counter-parts in other imperialist countries—are overwhelmingly linked with Conservative political and monopoly capitalist interests.

Thus the profound conflict which developed in Britain over the projected cricket tour helped to expose for millions of sportsfans the hidden realities. It was not just a difference of opinion about sport: it was an aspect of the class struggle. On the one hand stood the millionaire imperialist interests which want to maintain apartheid in South Africa and favour racialism in Britain as well. On the other side the great majority of the people who are against fascism and its South African variety, who feels solidarity with its victims. The right-wing leaders of the Labour Party were pulled step by step in the wake of the tide of public indignation awakened by the 'Stop the 70 Tour' campaign, until at last they were impelled to tell the indignant Cricket Council to call the whole thing off.

Thus, as it rages throughout the world, whether in the field of sport or any other sphere, the campaign to isolate the detestable apartheid regime proves to be more than a gesture with the fighting people of our country in their war of liberation. It *is* that of course, and the oppressed masses of South Africa deeply appreciate it as such. But it is also a catalytic issue which unites the best forces of the working people and progressive forces; exposes the true faces and motives of the friends of white supremacy; advances the fight against imperialism to a higher level.

SCHOLARSHIP OR ESPIONAGE

Everybody in Africa is familiar with the fact that over the last twenty five years there has been a great increase in the number of Americans engaged in sociological, economic and other research projects in Africa. Everyone active in African politics has become familiar with the inquisitive, insistent American academic who wants to know everything that is going on and offers eager assurances of his own pro-African sympathies in exchange. To us in Africa, the scale on which 'African studies' are pursued in the U.S.A. itself is a less familiar topic, but it comes as no surprise to us to hear that the scale is much greater than it used to be.

Perhaps there are some Africans so naive as to believe that all this activity is due to a purely scholarly and disinterested upsurge in American concern for Africa. Perhaps there are some who expect large sums of money to be made available for research simply because a lot of Americans want knowledge about Africa for its own sake.

They must, however, be very few. The African with some knowledge of the world and some political experience has always worked on the assumption that if the American ruling class makes money available for research it does so for its own purposes.

In recent months, a sudden crisis has erupted among the American academics involved in African studies. As a by-product of the crisis, a quantity of evidence has emerged about the motivation of these studies. It is evidence which we in Africa will do well to note.

The basic cause of the crisis lies in the fact that African studies were mainly the preserve of establishment-minded whites, but have in recent years attracted the interest of a radically minded blacks. It was 'Africanists' of the traditional type who in 1957 founded the African Studies Association. There were only thirty five members of this body at its foundation, but 1957 was the year of Ghanaian independence and saw the beginning of an explosion of American neo-colonialist involvement in Africa. In the years that followed, the membership of the African Studies Association grew to 1,500 and twenty-one American universities instituted African studies courses of one kind or another. The main sources of finance for this expansion were the U.S. Government, the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. The main purposes were to gather information and to train personnel for State Department, Army and CIA activities concerning Africa and for American companies investing in

Africa.

Meanwhile, the Afro-American community were also becoming far more interested than they had ever been before in all matters relating to Africa. For the most part the blacks had no interest in furthering the plans of the American ruling class. They also resented the fact that a subject in which they felt a special legitimate interest had become the preserve of white careerists with no real concern for Africa or its people.

Since few black Americans enjoy the senior academic status required to be a voting member of the African Studies Association, they were unable to command a majority in that body or to influence its policies by conventional means. They were nevertheless determined to bring about a change in the nature of the Association's activities. Matters came to a crisis at the Association's 1969 general meeting in Montreal. Lectures and seminars were disrupted by members demanding that basic political issues be discussed. A group which became known as 'the Black Caucus' was in continuous session for three days and it formulated the demands of the Afro-American members of the Association.

One demand was for the black members of the Association to have separate representation, equal in numbers to the representation of the white members, on the Association's executive. Whether in the particular situation which existed in that Association, this unusual demand was justified, is a question which goes beyond the scope of the present note. The important thing for us is that the 'Black Caucus' also demanded that in future, Africans studies by American academics should cease to serve the aims of American imperialism in Africa and should instead serve the purposes of African advancement and of solidarity between Africans and Afro-Americans. This it might be said, is a demand which will never be wholly won while American capitalism lasts. Nevertheless, it is good to know that there are progressive forces at work, struggling to divert some of the vast resources of the

American universities into constructive, instead of destructive work concerning our continent.

In the meantime, a great deal of valuable information has become public in the course of the controversy. A group called the Africa Research Group, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has published a pamphlet entitled *The Extended Family: A Tribal Analysis of U.S. Africanists.* This contains detailed documentation as to the sources of finance for establishment of African studies. It reveals the extend of official sponsorship of even the most prestigious, allegedly independent and liberal American scholars. For example, Gwendolyn Carter received a $117,000 contract from the U.S. Army in 1965 for the purpose of 'evaluating existing social science resources on Africa in the U.S.'. The phamphlet traces the very elaborate network of agencies and committees through which the work of American academics is chanelled into those directions which government and industry require. It notes such bizarre episodes as the preparation by the American University, Washington, D.C., for the U.S. Army, of a report on 'Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic and other Psychological Phenomena and their Implications on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo'.

In short, those of us who have always adopted an attitude of considerable reserve towards American academics in Africa have been abundantly justified. We shall continue to adopt that attitude, while welcoming the struggle of progressive Americans to displace the old gang from their positions of power.

A POPULAR FALLACY EXPLODED

According to one widely-advertised theory capitalist economic development in South Africa will 'inevitably' lead to 'liberalisation' of the regime. This concept has recently been given fresh currency by no less a person than U.S. Secretary of State Rogers. After the routine pious condemnation of apartheid, he adds in his 'Policy Statement on Africa' (March 31 1970):

'We do not believe cutting our ties with this rich, troubled land (South Africa) would advance the cause we pursue' (the almighty dollar?)

'We cannot accept the fatalistic view that only violence can ultimately resolve these issues...

'Rather we believe that the solution lies in the constructive interplay of political, economic and social forces which will inevitably lead to changes.'

So, the United Sates will continue to trade with and invest in apartheid South Africa.

Africans shouldn't resort to 'violence' (against the white supremacy and Portuguese fascist regimes which were born of and live by the daily practice of violence.) So says the spokesman of a country which is waging the most murderous of wars against Vietnam and is now spreading it to Cambodia and Laos.

'Rather,' they should wait for the 'inevitable' changes to be brought about by imperialist development.

This familiar theory has recently received a fatal blow, from a most unexpected source.

The Royal African Society of London has long been known as a last-ditch refuge of colonialism. Its chairman, Mr. Brian Macdona is a former general manager of Barclays Bank DCO, an advertisement for which notorious institution occupies the back cover of each issue of the Society's quarterly journal *African Affairs.* Recently the R.A.S. vice-chairman, Mr. N.E.Mustoe, Q.C., wrote a letter to *The Times* advocating the continuation of the S.A. Cricket tour. He went further than most pro-tour correspondents, whom he assailed for prefacing their remarks with a disclaimer of apartheid, which they considered 'immoral'. For his part, wrote Mustoe, he considered apartheid to be 'moral feasible and reasonable.'

However, fresh winds appear to be blowing even in this establishment institution. The April issue of *African Affairs* publishes a remarkable article entitled 'White Supremacy and White Prosperity in South Africa Today, by Frederick Johnstone of Oxford. Johnstone discusses the popular thesis that economic development in South Africa is somehow incompatible with and destructive of the white supremacy structure. This thesis—often associated with a corollary that capitalist development will 'inevitably liberalise' South Africa—serves as an important theoretical justification and rationale for the apologists of imperialist investments in Southern Africa.

The great merit of Johnstone's article is that—with meticulous documentation and factual support—he pulls this thesis to pieces.

He shows that over the past years of unparalleled economic expansion, in which the whites have really grown more prosperous and enormous profits have been accumulated, the inequalities between African and whites have steadily grown even greater than before. In 1969 the Africans (about 68 per cent of the population) received 18.8 per cent of S.A.'s personal income; the whites (19.2 per cent) received about 74 per cent of it. The writer also presents salient features of the declining standards of African education, trade union and other human rights, and increasing oppression.

> Economic development has thus not been undermining the basic labour structure of white supremacy in South Africa. Access by Africans to the essential means of economic power remains severely restricted and controlled, the distribution of income remains grossly unequal, and the general coercive powers of the government over African labour have been growing rather than diminishing. The core structure of labour discrimination remains strongly entrenched.
>
> These conditions indicate the exploitative nature of the economic relationship between the whites and the Africans. It is a master-servant relationship in all spheres, enforced through a variety of effective controls and sanctions. It is a system in which the Africans are forced to work for the whites at bare subsistence wages; deprived of all basic rights to assert their interests freely and legally, and subject to some of the most draconian and tyrannical labour controls ever developed in modern history. The

> enormous power and prosperity of the whites in South Africa is based on this systematic exploitation of African labour.
>
> The strong persistance over time of this discriminatory labour structure testifies to the collaboration of the different white interest groups in perpetuating it. Capitalist business, far from being incompatible with the system, secures high profits through very cheap, unorganised and rightless labour; white nationalists and white workers obtain prosperity and the material strengthening of white supremacy.
>
> In fact, far from undermining white supremacy, economic development is constantly re-inforcing it. Its power structure is continually strengthened by its own material output. In a circular process, the African workers produce the wealth and power which enable the whites to go on strengthening this structure of production which goes on producing the power which goes on strengthening the structure and so on. It is precisely the function of actual apartheid to render this process as effective as possible.

Mr Johnstone's article is of more than academic interest. By exposing the fallacy of the conventional theses, he is helping to pull the carpet from under the feet of those who use it for an 'ideological function—diverting critical attention away from the extensive collaboration of the capitalist system—both in South Africa and internationally—in the economic operation of white supremacy.'

Of course, there is a more fundamental sense in which economic changes *will* precipitate change. Sharpening the main contradiction between the colonialists and the oppressed masses, they are helping to mould and temper the real forces which can and will overthrow the racist regimes: the revolutionary, fighting liberation movements, spearheaded by the ever-growing proletariat, and helped by their true comrades-in-arms, especially the African states and the socialist countries.

IN KENYA NOW

N. Kimena

The last half of 1969 and the first quarter of 1970 have been marked by a chain of dramatic events in Kenya which opened a new chapter in the history of our country. These events which reached their climax by the arrest and detention of the leaders of the Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU) and its militant president Jaramogi Oginga Odinga in October 1969 are an inseparable part of the situation which has been building up since Kenya became independent.

Kenya's independence was won through one of the bitterest and bloody fight with arms in hand against the British imperialism (1952-1960) ever recorded in the history of British colonial Africa. Mass pressure; Mau Mau guerilla fights, strikes by the Kenya trade unions, positive resistance by the members of parliament and the militants against constitutional manipulations by the British; untiring and merciless exposures of political and military intrigues of the British Colonial office by anti-imperialist elements at public rallies; and the strong anti-British tension which had built up in the international scene against the cold-blooded murder of thousands of defenceless and innocent women, old people and children in Kenya—those are the real conditions in which Kenya entered into the period of transition to independence and are the true conditions in which the British colonialists were forced to independence negotiations.

The bitter fight for independence was dominated by the demand for the return of the fertile land which had been stolen from Africans by the British settlers and its redistribution among the peasants free of any payments. There was public outcry for full and genuine participation of the masses in economic and commercial activities of the country. There were also strong demands for free education, medical care, freedom of assembly, of movements and of the press; the need for higher income and for general improvement in the conditions of living A desire for national unity was expressed by the overwhelming people in Kenya. These are the conditions which the Kenya masses naturally expected that National government which comes to power after independence would be able to satisfy. And it is for this reason and not for anything else, that they supported and returned to power the Kenya African National Union (KANU) whose policies at that time were comparatively more favourable to these demands than those of the then opposition party—the Kenya African Democratic Union which was backed by the British settlers. Kanu leaders in their election manifesto of 1961 promised the masses: free seven years education; free medical care; elimination of unemployment and better conditions of service; the distribution of land to the landless and higher standard of living for all. It is on this platform that the party was put in power by the masses.

In December 1963 Kenya became politically independent from direct British rule with Jomo Kenyatta as the Prime

Minister. Two significant facts are worth recalling:

First, although KANU led Kenya to independence, right from the day of its inception in 1960, it had been divided into left and right wings, the former headed by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and the latter led by the late Tom Joseph Mboya. It has at times puzzled some people, why this division ever emerged at all since both Odinga and Mboya fought furiously against colonialism. But the truth is that the division was based on conflicting policies. Genuine and unfettered independence which must go beyond symbolic political independence and pave the way for radical economic and social changes and for rapid development of the national economy, was the line advanced by Odinga and other leftist politicians. The right-wing led by Mboya aimed at political independence as a means of acquiring hegemony for a small ruling elite who were determined to preserve the existing socio-economic system resting on the old imperial ties with Britain and other Western states.

Secondly, we must remember the role of Kenyatta's personality cult in the post-independence period. While jailed by the British, Kenyatta's image had been built up by political acitivists to disproportionate dimensions. It is generally alleged that Odinga's fiercely outspoken campaigns for Kenyatta's release contributed to this myth. This is quite incorrect. Many politicians, especially those of the right-wing in KANU, at first opposed his release. But on seeing the staggering support which Odinga had won from the masses for his firm demand for Kenyatta's release, they now wanted to cash in on the issue. Especially, on realising the inevitable release of Kenyatta, some politically barren elements like Kiano and others turned his name into a dialy sermon. This kind of propaganda is what built Kenyatta's cult into a mixture of reverence and of fear, presenting him as an infallible father-figure. It is this Kenyatta cult which, in the early years of our independence, prevented the emergence of a strong opposition to reactionary policies of his government. For example, his land policy was wrong right at the start. At the Lancaster House conference, Kenyatta led his party to an agreement which guaranteed big financial compensation for the British settlers for the expropriation of their farms and properties. This agreement covered all foreign-owned properties in Kenya including those who might decide to quit Kenya for their own reasons. To pay this 'compensation' he agreed to overload Kenya's poor economy and miserable national income with huge loans from the British Exchequer, and thereby committed the nation to a burden destined to perpetuate our dependence on Britain.

Kenyatta, who before his detention in 1952 and during his 9 years in prison and exile, had been erroneously regarded as an anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist militant, steadily and rapidly began to display openly his true colours. He began to see eye to eye with the right-wing elements like Mboya, Kiano and others. Free land distribution demanded by the peasants was rejected by his government, and Bildad Kaggia then an assistant Minister of Education was forced to resign because of his disagreement with the government's land policy. Among other things, Kaggia complained to the government about the worsening conditions of the peasants. One of the cases he cited was the eviction within one month of 50,000 farm workers with their wives and children, and another 600 families with over 100 school children from the white settlers' farms. Kaggia, rightly, saw no real solution in the present land policy of the government, but his ideas of collective and state farms on the socialist pattern were rejected outright.

Workers' demands for higher wages, better conditions of service and a brake on the soaring prices and rent costs were not only bluntly rejected, but wages were frozen and strikes by trade unions made illegal. Demands from the masses for free primary education and free medical services were refused and higher school and medical fees imposed. Unemployment rose by geometical progression—resulting from the increased number of school-leavers, landless population and because of reduced work places in the declining agricultural sector. Workers seeking jobs in towns and the city were hit hard by a new vagrancy law imposed by the government and many pauperised people were packed in police lorries back into their remote villages to face starvation.

Although the government claimed that direcct taxes were reduced and that people in lower income brackets were exempted from tax burden, this was set off by a range of high indirect taxation, especially those imposed on consumbable commodities essential for the life of the majority of poor Kenyans.

SOME GOT RICH

In contrast to this growing impoverishment of the masses and the government's unconcern over the teething problems facing the economically worse-off sections of Kenya society, a small group of people, both in government and outside it but closely associated with the ruling circles, were busy amassing great wealth and consolidating their positions in government and elsewhere. Many of them including government Ministers, MP's and senior civil servants, bought farms alongside the British settlers, supported by loans from the government and from other external and internal sources. A stock-exchange was set up in Nairobi to encourage the rich to buy shares; those highly placed in influential public positions easily acquired shares in the public companies. Nepotism became widely practiced and government posts and even jobs in the private sector of the economy became frequently filled through family and personal relationships with public figures. In schools, entrance exams are irrationally eroded and the top state organs responsible for education admit children to schools through undue influence.

In foreign policy, the government became increasingly pro-Western with a marked degree of inclination towards the United States. William Attwood, former American Ambassador to Kenya in his *The Reds and the Blacks,* admitted that his influence upon Kenyatta had led to the betrayal of the Congolese patriots which resulted in the Stanefyville massacre in 1965. His influence also led to the imposition of restriction of the movements of the socialist foreign missions in Kenya. But this by no means meant that the British influence receded in the face of the growing Yankee pressure on Kenyatta. On the contrary, the British influence thrived side by side with that of the USA despite the apparent imperialist rivalry between them. There was a growing hostility against the socialist camp which culminated in the rejection of Soviet military aid.

In 1964 anti-socialist elements in the cabinet of Kenyatta backed and advised by the CIA intelligence services, had in a most dramatic manner worked for the closedown of Lumumba Institute which was established by KANU militants to train party cadres. 27 district party officials who demanded a change to radical policies were arrested, hurriedly tried in court, and sentenced to imprisonment ranging up to a maximum of one and a half years. Expulsion of socialist journalists and diplomats became a routine matter in Kenya. Under the cloak of 'safeguarding against the infiltration of foreign ideology the late Tom Mboya with the aid of the CIA agents worked out the notorious Kenya Sessional Paper No. 10 which was spearheaded against the introduction of any progressive policies. It became an instrument for disorientation of the intellectuals and for misleading the masses. Kenyatta's Minister of Finance, James Gichuru, spoke at a Commonwealth conference in Lagos aginst majority rule for the Zimbabwe Africans and the government ignored OAU's resolution which demanded the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain on the UDI

It is in these tense and hostile struggles that the politial rift between left and right developed and reached its complete breaking point. At this stage, the left wing and mass opposition which had been gradually gathering momentum, began to take a new shape and a more open form. Earlier in 1965, Pio de Gama Pinto, a dedicated leftist had been overwhelmingly elected to parliament against strong opposition of the right-wing elements. But sooner or later, the right-wing retaliated to this by his brutal assassination in broad daylight. This heinous act opened a new stage in the political struggle in Kenya.

The imperialists, especially the United States, worked persistently and used every possible avenue to overthrow Odinga and other progressive elements from KANU and from the government to consolidate the position of the right-wing leadership in the party and in the government. First, they worked for the speedy dissolution of KADU and reinforced KANU with a contingent of right-wing elements composed of diehard colonial stooges such as Daniel Arap Moi, now Kenya's Vice-President, Ronald G. Ngala and others. And according to William Attwood, the absorption of KADU into KANU was a 'second key move in the developing strategy.'

In the parliament, the struggle became so tense that at times, the right-wing elements headed by Kenyatta was forced to resort to threats in order to get some unpopular bills passed by the parliament.

The right-wing leaders were obsessed by the growing pressure from the masses who persistently showed their discontent with the government policies. They removed from all the district party leadership those who supported or even sympathised with these policies. It was now inevitable that an open show of strength between the left and the right wings must come sooner or later. The right wing demanded the resignation of Odinga from the Cabinet and at times his official functions were denied him.

The infamous Limuru Conference marked the climax of the open struggle in KANU between the left and the right wings. The right wing and the government hand-picked people who masqueraded as branch party officials united to approve a new Party constitution and elect new party office bearers. The Constitution abolished the post of Vice-President which was held by Odinga. This so-called KANU 'National' conference was conducted under the chairmanship of Jomo Kenyatta in a surrounding highly polluted with the venomous anti-socialist campaign.

K.P.U. IS FOUNDED

In that atmosphere, all the progressive elements in KANU were voted out. It was the beginning of a long drawn out, bitter class struggle. The right-wing usurped power but abandoned the people whom they claimed they were representing. The leftists had the support of the masses and to be sure that their (the masses) aspirations were sound and defended against the enemy's onslaught, they needed an independent political organisation. It became utterly impossible to continue working inside KANU; its leaders became extremely hostile to any ideas or policies which aimed at furthering the course of the underprivileged masses. Time rang for the masses to come out of KANU and rally their own forces in an independent political body. This was preceded by the resignation of 29 MP's including Oginga Odinga from KANU and the government, and all joined together to form the now banned Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU), as a vanguard for the toiling masses. Thus Kenyatta's counter-revolution which began in 1963, on the eve of Independence was completed.

It was the beginning of a new era in Kenya. The struggle of Kenya people against neo-colonialism, for complete economic independence and for radical social changes, started to be championed by the KPU which preached to the masses the tasks confronting them and their role in this struggle. From its very beginning, the KPU swiftly developed into a massive movement and its popular leaders and mass support shook the government to its very roots. In 48 hours the government changed its constitution to remove those who resigned from their parliamentary seats and tracked them down in their constituencies with American-style of election rigging. That is what saved the government from crumbling down like a rotten wall.

The new party, the KPU proclaimed a programme which embodied in a broad manner, the vital demands of the majority of Kenya people. Among other things, it proclaimed active and full workers' participation in all economic, social and political activities of the state; radical land reform was promised and better credit and loan facilities for the small farmers and for petty traders. It also aimed at taking over key economic levers into the State Sector and ending the country's dependence on imperialism through increased domestic efforts while accepting disinterested external assistance. Rapid industrialisation, wide social reforms including education reforms, wiping out illiteracy, extirpation of the backward rural life—are the important features of the KPU's programme widely known under the title 'Wananchi Declaration' (i.e., 'The Peoples' Declaration'). 1970 is the year when Kenyatta's regime had planned to carry out the general election which was officially due in 1968 but had been postponed against the will of the masses. Since the formation of KPU in 1966, the government's position had steadily become weak, shaky and its influence on the masses dwindled. KANU and government leaders found themselves faced with mass opposition everywhere. In urban and rural areas the opposition built up to such proportions that no rallies or public meetings could be held by KANU, leave alone the possibility to address them. In many parts of the country the KPU symbol of the bull, became a common salutation word of the public. On a number of occassions, Kenyatta's attempts to address small audiences in Nairobi turned out to be futile; and quite often, face saving attempts were made to address civil servants including teachers and school children. In those circumstances the government feared the risk of holding a general election.

Since the government postponed elections in 1968 two important questions had preoccupied KANU and government leadership and its foreign backers. First, who should succeed Kenyatta, now sick and over 80 years old? Secondly, how to arrange the succession? Since Odinga and other progressive men had been forced out of KANU the government had calculated that the successor to Kenyatta and the problem of leaving eternal power in the hands of a growing bourgeoisie was to be automatically solved within KANU. On the contrary, it became more difficult for them, if not impossible, to solve these problems openly and through democratic elections. Mass opposition, dissatisfaction in Civil Service and among a certain section of the armed forces made it extremely difficult for the government to do so.

THE RIFT IN KANU

Moreover, a new phenomenon had come to the surface which further polarised political relationship inside the ruling KANU and unfolded dangerous political rivalry within the right-wing circles. KANU split in two—KANU 'A' and 'B'. ('A' signifying American, and 'B' signifying Britain) in the battle for the successor to Kenyatta. This rift carried no trace of any ideological conflict, although, in an attempt to beat Mboya to submission, Kenyatta often resorted to tribalism. In wing 'B', Kenyatta included, apart from the Kikuyu

KANU MP's, other subservient and more political impervious elements are to be found such as Daniel Arap Moi, Paul Ngei, and Bruce Mackenzie.

Despite all those obstacles, it became increasingly pressing for the contending parties in KANU to find a successor to Kenyatta immediately and to hold general elections under the aegis of the rapidly declining national prestige of Kenyatta. Although he had lost nearly all the support of the masses, Mboya was still stubborn and well backed by a certain section of the American imperialists. The government was aware that even without Odinga and KPU in the arena, easy election victory for KANU was ruled out. This is the dilemma which faced Kenyatta and his imperialist supporters in their task to prepare the ground for Kenya's first general election since independence in December 1963. As time passed, elements in KANU 'B' became more desperate about the situation because of fear of what would happen if Kenyatta died suddenly before the question of party and government leadership was settled.

The desperation and conflicts between KANU 'A' and 'B' increased with the intermittent news about Kenyatta's serious illness, especially in 1968 when it was rumoured that he had died and an obituary which was to announce his death was foiled officially when it nearly went to press and the author of it summarily sacked from the Editorship of the paper *The Nation.*

THE MURDER OF TOM MBOYA

At the beginning of July 1969, the bell tolled for the impasse to be broken and dramatic events began to unfold. On 5th July, Tom Mboya who had been ordered by Kenyatta to return home from Addis Ababa where he attended a U.N. Conference, was shot dead in a chemist's shop in the centre of Nairobi in broad daylight. No one in Kenya believes that the murder of so prominent a public figure was accidental: it was a deliberate plan of certain KANU schemers and their foreign advisers. The plan had two important strategies. First, the elimination of Mboya, it was thought, would result in the automatic retention of power by the tribal minded Kikuyu politicians or by those more subservient and susceptible to neo-colonial policies. Secondly, this assassination was to be blamed on the KPU and therefore could have served the government as a pretext for complete routing of the party and to justify the suppression of the KPU leaders. But the events took a course not anticipated by those who planned the murder. It was followed by insurmountable opposition to the government. The strategy boomeranged. Hostilities against the government and the Kikuyus—the community from which the assassin of Mboya comes—spread rapidly all over the country. And at the requiem held in Nairobi, anti-government violence broke out in which a face-to-face battle with the president's body guards and other members of the armed forces took place.

The feeling that the government was implicated in the assassination ran high. Many members of the government including Masinde Muliro, Ngala, Mwendwa and some MP's publicly condemned the assassination and demanded the exposure of the culprits and their collaborators. More striking was the unequivocal statements made by the leaders of the KPU and their unreserved demand for stern and quick action against the assassin and the conspirators. Odinga and other KPU leaders firmly condemmed the politics of assassination, which was rapidly becoming a routine in the political scene in Kenya. The method of assassination, the KPU leaders declared, could not solve the country's problems nor was it a weapon desired by the progressives in their struggle against their opponents.

The government was pushed onto the defensive and merely retorted by hysterically regurgitating hackneyed and infamous anti-communist phrases which no longer appeal to the oppressed and exploited masses. The Vice-President of Kenya, Arap Moi, accused socialist countries of the murder and publicly exculpated imperialism from it. This ridiculous accusation, if it achieved anything at all, helped to transform anti-government hostilities from a whirlwind into a hurricane. Kenyatta and his government became more isolated from the public, and the people's determination to bring a stop to the rule of force by an unpopular clique became much stronger. The government was forced by mass pressure to arrest and try the murderer of Mboya, although the men who planned and backed the murder were never exposed by the trial. The 'big man' who the murderer alleged to be behind the assassination was never named publicly or brought to trial.

KENYATTA RESORTS TO TRIBALISM

In a desperate attempt to stave off the threat of downfall of the government, Kenyatta willfully allowed Kikuyus truck-loaded from all parts of the Central province to administer oaths in his own home at Gatundu. The people who travelled to the oathing ceremony in the trucks marked 'KANU Special' promised to defend by any means, including the use of weapons, the Kenya flag and political power from leaving the 'Nyumba ya Mumbi' (i.e. the House of Mumbi—the traditional ancestral mother of the Kikuyus). They pledged personal allegiance to Kenyatta. This event marked President Kenyatta's abdication from the nation and from the national leadership and his return to tribalism and tribal leadership. *Sauti ya Wananchi,* a paper published in London by the Kenya Socialist Group, correctly pointed out: 'The Government—and especially the Kenyatta-led inner ruling clique—are aware that the masses are disgusted with the betrayal that has taken place since independence. They know that the masses are turning against them....Their only defence is to stir up crude tribalism and try to prevent the masses from uniting in a demand for a change of government and a change of policy'.

As far as Kenyatta-led inner ruling clique was concerned, one of their strategical aims had been achieved which was, the elmination of the leader of KANU 'A'. It showed clearly the determination of Kenyatta and his government to adopt more coercive methods to maintain unpopular rule over the majority of Kenya people. The fact that Mboya's assassination failed to lead to the routing of the KPU and its leadership, as it had been originally planned, actually increased that determination. It left one question unsolved: The general election would not be held until the KPU had been wiped out of the scene leaving no obstacle to the ambitions of Kenyatta and his power hungry clique.

To some observers it remained to be seen how the government would defy massive opposition from the people and how long it would be able to prolong its life in power. During the trial of Isacc Nashon Njenga Njoroge, Mboya's assassin, a fruitless effort was made to create stories connecting the murder with the KPU. It was obvious that the government was bent on seeking a pretext in order to suppress the KPU.

THE KISUMU INCIDENT

In Ocotober 1969, Kenyatta decided to go to Kisumu to 'open' a Soviet-aided hospital. Nearly two years had passed since the hospital's construction was completed and had been put into operation. The decision to open the hospital at that time when two years ago Kenyatta had refused without good reason to perform its official opening ceremony was a matter of convenience. Those events which took place at this ceremony proved this. Addressing a large crowd of people who attended the 'opening' ceremony, in which such prominent figures as the Soviet Ambassador, the Mayor of Kisumu and Ogina Odinga were present, the Kenya newspapers reported, Kenyatta launched a furious personal attack on Odinga and the KPU. 'You will soon see who rules in Kenya', Kenyatta warned Odinga. 'You face jail', added Kenyatta. These attacks came from Kenyatta after the crowd had answered to his statements by shouting 'Dume' (ie bull) which is the election symbol of the KPU. As Kenyatta and his entourage left the hospital, the public continued to shout the bull and show their thumb mark of the symbol. This angered Kenyatta who in a fit of fury, gave command to his escort of bodyguards to open fire on the crowd which lined up along the street. Indiscriminate shooting laid 27 people dead and about 100 wounded—mostly women and children. The next days after that, Odinga and Nthula the KPU's vice-president, were placed under house arrest on Kenyatta's orders. This was immediately followed by the arrest and detention of all the opposition MP's including the veteran Achieng Oneko, publicity secretary of the KPU. Oneko was jailed with Kenyatta for 9 years during the British rule in Kenya; Kenyatta has sent him to detention again. A state of emergency was declared, imposing a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Central Nyanza. Within a few days, Odinga and Nthula were removed from house arrest and were transferred to an unknown area where they were detained. The properties of the KPU were confiscated and the party banned. The second strategy was achieved.

Kenyatta and his government of a clique, unashamedly tried to justify this act of high-handedness and suppression of a democratic movement by alleging that the KPU 'has been responsible for organising subversion, for the formation of tribalism and strife'.

From the time the party was banned the government began to move swiftly to hold the general elections. It had been announced, before the banning of the KPU, that the elections were to be held in June 1970; but this was again shifted back to January 6th 1970. The removal of the KPU and its leaders from the scene deluded the government into thinking that victory for KANU would be won easily. On the contrary, bitter disappointment was in store for Kenyatta and his ruling clique. The Kenya masses decided to register their anger and dissatisfaction with government policies.

NO CONFIDENCE VOTE

When the election results were announced, two-thirds of KANU's former MP's including five Senior Cabinet Ministers and fourteen Assistant Ministers were voted out of the parliament. The British *Daily Mail* described the election results as 'the loudest protest in Kenya's history'. It was a vote of no confidence in the government. The new members promised to work for a change in government policies and a closer cooperation with the masses. Some of them promised to work hand in glove with the masses for the release of the leaders of the KPU These election 'promises' are hotchpotch hullabaloo quite characteristic of bourgeois-type of democracy; nevertheless the election results demonstrated the invincible force of the masses and their unyielding opposition to the government policies.

As was expected, there has been no change in the policies since the new cabinet was formed in January. In fact, plans are under way to shift the government policies farther to the right. In recent statements, the government has shown its determination to continue, despite popular opposition, to hold illegally in detention the leaders of the KPU, the banning of the party and the freedom of association, of press and of expression. The British *Times* published a statement in its Diary Column in March which alleged that the Kenya government plans to murder Odinga while in a solitary detention camp. Although the government tried to deny the allegation in its usual dubious way, it did not remove the public fear that the murder of Odinga may be planned in the future by the government. Moreover, the health of the detainees, their places of detention, diet and their general conditions are still a mystery to the public of Kenya. The government has also refused the detainees the right of meeting their families and relatives.

IN THE CLUTCHES OF FOREIGN MONOPOLIES

What about the government's economic failures? Is there a possibility that the government's economic policies may change? The answer is NO. Kenya's economy is declining further into the financial clutches of the Western monopolies. Agriculture which plays a dominant part in Kenya's economy is the stronghold of monopoly capital. 66% of dairy produce; over 96% of sisal products, 66% of sugar, 40% of coffee (Kenya's chief export commodity) and 78% of tea and pork produce are in the hands of chiefly the foreign monopoly companies. In commerce and industry, foreign capital controls the production and sale of beer, tobacco, printing and publishing work, paper and paper products, metal products, chemicals, oil refineries, mining operations and many textile activities and commerce. Banks, financial corporations and societies, insurance companies, external and internal trade, hotels, road transport—all are owned and controlled by foreign companies with most of their parent offices situated overseas. Most of the managerial and executive personnel, especially in the private sector are expatriates.

The foreign economic grip on Kenya is being felt severely by the toiling masses. The unofficial statistical source shows that over 960,000 people are unemployed in Kenya in 1970. This is about 27% of the total Kenya labour force. Poverty among the masses is deepening and social differentiation is rapidly running across the society. The minimum wage in Nairobi is 150 shillings, (i.e. £7½ East African) a month; while a Kenya Minister earns about 7,000 shillings p.m. (i.e. EA£350 p.m.)—enough to pay minimum wages for 44 people. The per capita income is about £45 increased by only £7 over its pre-independence level, that is, an annual growth rate of less than 3% against the population rise of 3.3% of a year!

Before the Kenya masses and all democratic and patriotic people who are opposed to the Kenyatta regime now stand the questions:

1) What must be done to secure the release of the leaders of the banned KPU and to restore the right of mass political activities in Kenya?

2) How to organise the struggle, and consolidate mass opposition against the neo-colonialist policies of the government and its divide-and-rule policy of tribalism?

These are questions that are being posed by the tasks of our present struggle in Kenya. And they are the tasks that face all democratic people, both inside and outside Kenya. A solution to these questions is not easy. But it must be emphasised that the people will win. For this purpose they must organise and build the political groups in villages, clans, locations, districts, provinces, towns and in the city. Workers and employees in every factory, office, firm or farm must build political cells. Students at the universities and schools must also organise. These groups and activities must be coordinated; they must be centralised and centrally directed. Since the government has suppressed any legal movements, the only way open to the people is the clandestine one. The Kenya people's desire for freedom, better living conditions for all, cannot be broken down by the government's autocratic rule. The Kenya masses understand this axiom beter than anybody else. It was their fight that drove out the British colonialists and brought independence to Kenya which Kenyatta and his ruling clique have now hijacked. It was again their bitter and relentless fight that secured the release of Jomo Kenyatta who has now abandoned them. They will learn to fight just as effectively in the new conditions, and they will win!

ISRAEL: AFRICA'S FRIEND OR FOE ?

Samuel Ben Adam

> *It is of the utmost importance for the African working people to recognise their enemies both at home and abroad'.*
>
> - Ali Yata

'What is really at stake (in the Middle East) is not "Israel's right to exist" but the right of the Arab peoples to free themselves completely from imperialism'.

This conclusion, formulated in this journal at the time of Israel's June 1967 agression against the neighbouring Arab states, has been amply confirmed in word and deed by the Israeli rulers.

General Haim Herzog in his introduction to the 'Victory' album produced in those heady days of vainglorious intoxication said: 'If Israel had not opened the June 1967 War the whole Middle East, Western and Southern Asia and also the greater part of the American continent would have come under the influence of the Soviet Union. The game was over the domination of a considerable part of the world'. Herzog is the military commentator for the Israeli Broadcasting Services and was the first military governor of the occupied areas on the

West Bank of the Jordan. Identifying 'Soviet influence' with anti-imperialist revolutionary movements is a favourite tactic of the capitalist ideologists. Herzog's words must also be read as a form of special pleading to the U.S. government for its continued support for the Israeli rulers' own plans of conquest and territorial expansion.

It is sufficient to cite the Israeli refusal to agree to the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, their continued provocations against the neighbouring states (now including Lebanon), their ruthless and cruel disregard for the rights of the Palestine Arab people, and their plans (if not as yet clearly expressed but clearly envisaged) to create a reservoir of cheap labour from amongst the hundreds of thousands of refugees and inhabitants of the occupied areas.

Two reports from the London-based 'Israel Today' confirm this last point. The first (6.3.1970) prepares the ground by quoting how 'much better off' the West Bank Arabs now were; the second (20.3.1970) quoted Abba Eban who, in answer to a question about Egyptian press reports that Israel was considering such a step (moving 300,000 Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip to the occupied West Bank of the Jordan) said no decision had yet been reached. 'But he added that Israel would not oppose movements desired by the people themselves for economic reasons...'

It is not solely as the agents of imperialism that Israel's rulers pursue their policies of aggression, oppression and exploitation; they do so also in pursuit of their own ambitions. So long as these do not conflict with imperialism's over-all strategy, interests and aims, the Israeli ruling circles are assured of imperialist backing. Because development is uneven within the imperialist camp Israel has from time to time come into conflict with one or another of the imperialist powers—Britain at the time of the first Arab-Israel War in 1947-1948, the United States at the time of the combined

British-French-Israeli agression against the UAR in 1956, France in the June 1967 War. None of these conflicts however have ever seen imperialism forsake the Zionist State. The reason is not far to seek: *The Zionist ideology and Zionist movement which dominate the State of Israel are the reflection and expression of the reactionary politics of the Jewish bourgeoisie and its collaboration with imperialism against the Arab peoples in their fight against imperialism, and with imperialism against the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.*

The 16th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel subjected Zionism to a thorough analysis. The Congress found:

> 1. In capitalist countries the Zionist Movement collaborates with the great bourgeoisie of those countries against the revolutionary working class movement, against communism, preaching the severance of the Jewish workers from their class brothers, from the struggle for overthrowing the regime for socialism.
> 2. In the Middle East the Zionist Movement has served, since the time of Turkish rule, through British rule and up to the present day, as loyal ally of all sorts of imperialists fighting the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples, contrary to the national interests of the people of Israel.
> 3. In Israel the Zionist movement acts against the interests of the toilers, for the isolation of the Jewish workers from Arab workers. It fosters distrust between them and propagates chauvinsim and national arrogance. Zionism in Israel works against the national liberation of the people of Israel from the chains of foreign capital and dependence on imperialism and it conducts a policy of territorial expansion with the assistance of imperialism.
> 4. Zionism serves as one of the tools of imperialism in its global struggle and its work of political and ideological subversion against the socialist states.
> 5. In Asia, Africa and Latin America Zionism assists the neo-colonialist activities of the USA, West Germany, Britain and other imperialist states.
>
> *Information Bulletin* Communist Party of Israel, 3-4/1967
> Materials of the 16th Congress.

The ever-increasing alignment of Israeli policy with that of Washington's was clearly expressed in the first years of the State's existence. When the then Foreign Minister, the late M. Sharett, spelled out what this policy meant the Left Zionist daily *Al Hamishmar* (August 8, 1952) commented:

> The premises of M. Sharett's explanation says: 'No assistance to Israel on the part of American Jews is possible if there exists a conflict between Israel and the USA'. This means the active participation of the Jews of the USA in the building of our state is conditioned on the integration of Israel's foreign policy into the global strategy of Washington. Our Jewish brothers from overseas will not help us if we do not subordinate ourselves to the will of their government.

THE LINK WITH GERMAN IMPERIALISM

One of the first acts carried out by the Israeli rulers in line with this orientation was the rehabilitation of the heirs to Hitler's Reich. In flagrant contradiction to the Potsdam Agreements the Western powers had decided to rebuild German monopoly rule and the German war machine. The fears of the world had to be appeased. What better way than getting the 'spokesmen' for the survivors of those who had suffered so cruelly at the Nazis' hands (the Jews of Europe who had found refuge in Israel) to endorse the respectability of the West Germany that had been set up? In September 1952 the Luxemburg Treaty between the Federal German Republic and the State of Israel was signed. Ostensibly a 'reparations agreement' the Treaty in reality gave the green light to the West Germain revanchists and their Western backers. It also went a long way to the creation and strengthening of an armed imperialist outpost in the Middle East.

In the name of 'compensation' for the Hitlerite massacre, in fact Hitler's heirs and successors were building up an imperialist bridgehead in the Middle East. No better exposure of this manoeuvre has been made than that of the Communist Deputy in the German Diet, speaking on March 4th 1953. I make no apology for citing his remarks at length:

> The deaths and the murder of 6 million Jews are one long indictment of a fearful system of barbarism and contempt for mankind. A good many words have been spoken here about this. But we protest against people taking the floor here, who, when it was a matter of preventing these crimes, either stood aside or assisted.
>
> And I say today with the same emphasis, that this agreement between the Federal Republic and the State of Israel does not serve to make restitution for the unbounded and bestial crimes....I will let the facts speak for them-

> selves:
>
> 1. The Federal Government undertakes to pay 3,000 million Marks to the State of Israel.
>
> 2. In addition to this sum there is a figure of 450 million Marks to a Federation of Zionist Organisations.
>
> 3. The payment of the entire sum is to take place in the form of shipments of goods:... In addition, the English shipment of oil to Israel in the amount of 75 million Marks annually is to be paid for.
>
> It is worth noting that the shipments of agricultural products make up only 1.5% of the annual total. Under the name of indemnity, therefore, the industrialists of Israel will receive from West Germany everything they need to build up their basic industries. This fact proves that this agreement has nothing to do with reparations. This is confirmed by the statement in his agreement under which these payments to Israel are not to be affected by the payments to the individual Jews under the domestic German reparation laws. In plain words this means that the persecuted individuals in Israel will not receive a single penny of the 3,000 million, whereas the industrialists will do a splendid stroke of business. Not only they, however, are the beneficiaries of this agreement, but above all the gentlemen in the American armament industry and high finance. It is they who are behind this agreement and who brought it about; not for reasons of humanity and philanthropy. Very concrete reasons underline this policy. The American imperialists are creating a strong strategic and military base in the Near East...against the peoples of the Near East and North Africa. With the help of the industrial equipment of West Germany, then, the Americans wish to build up the State of Israel, which is in their hands, into an armament and operating base for their aggressive policy.
>
> Those who gain from this agreement are not only the masters of industry in Israel and the Americans, they are also the industrialists of West Germany, who are thus assured sales and giant profits for several years ahead. Is it not a downright disgusting mockery of the racially persecuted that those who share in the responsibility for the mass murder, who made huge profits under Hitler and on his massacre of the Jews, today once more wish to pocket giant profits under the cloak of this sort of reparation...'
>
> (Quoted in *The German Path to Israel* by Ralph Vogel. Oswald Wolff, London 1969, p.85. The German Communist Party was soon afterwards declared illegal; only towards the end of 1968 was a Communist Party legally allowed to exist in West Germany once more).

From whitewashing Hitler's heirs to endorsing the genocide being perpetrated by the US in Vietnam is but a short step. Following his notorious 'Vietnamising of the war' speech of November 3, 1969 President Nixon received a 'private' laudatory letter from Israeli Premier Golda Meir; and in January of this year a 'private' military delegation of the Thieu-Ky clique visited Israel. It met with officials from the Defence Department, receiving 'information about the structure of the Defence Ministry and Israel's border situation', and visited an arms factory. *(Jerusalem Post Weekly,* March 3, 1970).

From Bonn to Saigon, from returning the refugee, Georgi Panagolis, to the Greek Junta whence he had escaped, from being French imperialism's steadfast supporter in its war against the Algerian working people to advising the fascists in South Africa—such is the consistent pattern Israel's rulers have weaved for the State of Israel.

ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA

'On Algeria, Israel stood steadfastly by her principal ally, France; and on South Africa, while aligning itself with United Nations' opposition to the Republic's racial policies, Israel trod a delicate path' declared an Israeli statesman, quoted *The new States of Asia,* (London 1963.)

Israel did not tread 'a delicate path' vis-a-vis South Africa 'because of the presence of 110,000 Jews in South Africa', described as 'hostages' by this writer. The threads linking South Africa's racists and Israel's Zionists go far deeper than this.

The late Verwoerd was in no way sympathising with the Arab refugees when he stated: '(The Jews) took Israel from the Arabs after the Arabs had lived there for a thousand years...Israel, like South Africa is an apartheid state' *(Verwoerd,* by A. Hepple, Penguin, 1967). He was chiding Israel for voting against South Africa in the United Nations in November 1961. 'People in glass houses shouldn't throw stones', Verwoerd was really saying. (The reason for Israel's vote will be made clear below).

South Africa's Jewish community is not only one of the largest (about 120,000 today) but also one of the wealthiest of the world's Jewsih communities. South African Jewry was prominent in the commercial, industrial, professional and cultural sectors of South African life, long before the establishment of the State of Israel. Zionism had taken root amongst the leaders of the community. Never-ending fund raising events, cultural affairs and active promotion of the Zionist-Israeli cause has seen a steady stream of settlers, investments and donations flowing to Israel.

Not all the Jews of course are Zionists. Many South African Jews have been active participants in the struggle for national liberation, in the struggles of the revolutionary working class movement and its Communist Party. In the main, as elsewhere in the world, it has been the wealthier section of South African Jewry that has dominated, exploited and perverted the affinty which Jewish people feel for the Holy Land, Palestine, the State of Israel.

The community as a whole as represented by its leading organs, undoubtedly supported Israel, and has greatly contributed to its present position. Many of those in top government posts in Israel are South African-born: Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Chairman of the Jewish Agency, Louis Pincus and former Israeli representative at the United Nations, Mike Comay, are but three of the most prominent, who have found the move from apartheid-South Africa to Zionist-Israel an easy task. (Eban had the added experience of serving in the British Colonial Office).

Sympathy for Israel following her June 1967 aggression was not confined, however, solely to the South African Zionists. White South Africans of all political complexions identified themselves with the Israeli cause. The Johannesburg *Star* reporting from Cape Town on June 10, 1967, wrote that the Broederbond, the secret fascist organisation that dominates the Nationalist Party 'had made a sizeable contribution to funds to assist Israel'. All in all in a remarkably short period of no more than 3-4 weeks, £10 million was 'mobilised' in South Africa for Israel, a sum, which despite the stringent financial regulations on the export of capital, Vorster allowed to be transferred.

Why this concern for Israel from those who had been

Hitler's admirers, supporters and in some cases comrades-in-arms?

Like the Israeli General, Haim Herzog, cited above, the Chief Rabbi of Cape Town knew the reason. 'If the war had not been won (by Israel)' he said 'terrorism would have spread throughout Africa. We Jews feel that it was not only for Israel a victory against enemies who received constant support and even incitement from Russia, but also a decisive victory for democracy and the Western world'. (The Rabbi is perhaps rethinking the situation. Far from 'a decisive victory', the June 1967 aggression has proved to be a miserable failure: Israel's sons are still forced to shed their blood, the 'democracy' of bannings, arrest, torture, expulsions from homes, blowing up of villages, napalm is more and more becoming a feature of Israeli life, and the 'Western World's' influence in the region is steadily being further undermined as may be gathered from the revolutions in Sudan and Libya, and the growth of the popular anti-imperialist forces in Lebanon, Jordan and the oil-producing enclaves on the Gulf).

But it was not only South African Jews who exulted over the Zionist aggression. The top leaders of South Africa's political and financial circles, are strengthening their links with Israel.

Henry Oppenheimer, the mining tycoon from Johannesburg recently visited Israel, whose diamond-cutting industry, supplied by de Beers, is a big foreign-currency earner. South Africans were prominent participants in the 'millionaries conferences' held in Israel in 1967 and 1968, and a 'Friends of South Africa' society has been set up in Israel.

The South African Foundation, the co-ordinating organisation of big business interests in South Africa and their international connections, has reconstructed its Israeli-South African committee.

Their first task was to arrange a meeting between Botha, South Africa's Defence Minister and S. Peres, secretary-general of the ruling Labour Party and a former Deputy Defence Minister. The subsequent sharing of military secrets was carried a stage further with the visit of General Hod, Israeli Air Force chief, who addressed South African officers at Pretoria's Air Force College. *Important as the secrets of Israel's blitzkrieg tactics might have been to the South Africans, they were more impressed by the fact that the Western powers had in no way interfered with Israel's conquest of vast tracts of Arab territory. This, more than anything else, made it easier for the South African rulers to decide to send their forces into Zimbabwe to prop up the Smith regime and to engage the ZAPU/ANC liberation forces which had renewed operations in August 1967.* South African mercenaries and official units operate with the Portuguese army in Angola and Mozambique; they engage in sabotage attacks on installations in Zambia and Tanzania; they man key positions necessary for maintaining Banda's rule in Malawi.

Mulder, South African Minister of Information, forcefully expressed the motives behind the South African government's policy in a speech, in November 1968. The frank aim of 'world communism' was to appropriate Africa and thus to encircle Europe, he said. Only two states today were still obstacles in the way of the Red plan—Israel and South Africa.

'We refuse merely to defend. The eyes of the West must open and they must realise that the Republic is the key to the conquest of Africa'.

How many times have the Israeli rulers said 'We refuse merely to defend'?

How many times have the Israeli rulers said 'Israel is the key to the conquest of the Middle East'?

When he arrived to take up his post at the beginning of 1969 the new Israeli Consul-General to South Africa agreed fully with Mulder. Commenting that it was hot (summertime) when he stepped off the plane at Jan Smuts Airport, whereas it had been cold winter when he left Tel-Aviv, he was sure all appreciated that if not for Jerusalem much colder winds would be sweeping through Africa on to Pretoria'.

The Republic of South Africa in the South, the State of Israel in the North the twin armed juggernauts of imperialism, united to throttle the African Revolution, their very words condemn them.

But it is not only by armed aggression that Israel and South Africa hope to maintain our continent as the backyard of their own ruling circles and capitalist interests and the permanent field of exploitation for the imperialists. Economic, ideological and military subversion of the continent is also part of their armoury. The Vorster 'outward-looking policy' is nothing but an adaptation of a policy Israel has been pursuing these past 15 odd years.

It is no accident that the unrepentant Nazi Vorster and the 'socialist' Golda Meir find themselves in the same camp at either end of our continent. Both in their ideologies and in their practices there are close affinities between the rulers of Israel and South Africa.

ZIONISM AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISM

A nation cannot be free and at the same time continue to oppress other nations. (Engels in 1874)

70 years ago the Afrikaners had the sympathy and support of progressive world opinion in their resistance to Britain's armed incorporation of the Boer Republics into the Empire. So too, in the immediate post-World War II years, the Jews in Palestine have the backing of many progressives throughout the world in their struggle against the British Mandate Authority. The emergence of Afrikaner Nationalism as the strongest organised political force in South Africa in 1948, was, unlike the establishment of the State of Israel in the same year, welcomed only by the most reactionary forces in the world.

Twenty-two years of Nationalist Party rule have served to justify the very worst fears.

Twenty-two years of the Zionist State have served to wipe away all illusions about the nature of Zionism, for today, along with the Apartheid Republic, Israel stands in the forefront of those states whose policies constitute a threat to the peace, progress and prosperity of the world.

It would be wrong to equate Israel with South Africa in a mechanical manner. There are differences between them. South Africa is openly a racist-fascist dictatorship, whilst in Israel access to bourgeois democratic institutions (Knesset-parliament local councils, trade unions, etc.) is to a certain extent open to all sections of the population, including Communists. The development of the class struggle has forced the South African and Israeli rulers to exercise state power in different ways. It would be equally wrong to believe, however, that because of these differences, that because the State of Israel projects a 'democratic image', it poses any less of a threat to the African Revolution than does Vorster's Republic. It is precisely because of its 'liberal face' that U.S. imperialism finds Israel such a valuable instrument for subverting Africa's struggle to break free from the capitalist world, the indispensable prerequisite for overcoming the legacy of colonial and imperialist rule, plunder and exploitation.

Both Zionism and Afrikaner Nationalism propagate the concept of a 'chosen people' specially created by God to lead their adherents to 'new Jerusalems'. It is not surprising to find Zionists accepting the *theory* of 'separate development' (apartheid) as a reasonable solution to South Africa's 'race' problem. This is how they would have like to solve their 'Arab problem'. The Zionist and the white South African find common ground in their attitudes to dark-skinned people. Take this extract from an interview conducted by the Hebrew newspaper *Ha'aretz* (15.11.1968) with David

Hacohen, industrialist, Israeli Labour Party M.P. and at that time Chairman of the important Knesset Foreign and Security Affairs Committee. Describing his experiences in London in the 1920's he said:

> When I entered the club of socialist students—Englishmen, Irish, Jews, Chinese, Indians and Africans—all of us were under British rule—I had already then to fight with my friends...about Jewish socialism; I had to defend the fact that I did not receive Arabs in my trade-union, the Histradut; that one preaches to picket citrus plantations so that no Arab could work here; to pour petrol on 'Arab' tomatoes, to attack Jewish housewives in (Arab) markets and smash 'Arab' eggs in their baskets; to praise...the Jewish National Fund which buys (lands) from absentee effendi and ejects the fellahin... As a socialist to take a symbol of capitalism, Rothschild and call him 'the well-known philanthropist'—this was not so simple...

Truly a strange kind of 'socialism' this! This history of the various Zionist organisations describing themselves as 'Socialist' reveal that there never was, never could be and never will be a 'Jewish' or 'Zionist' socialism. In all the decisive struggles of the revolutionary international working class movement they have sided with imperialism against soicalism, against national liberation. But that is another story.

The essence is that under the influence of similar exclusive nationalist ideologies, both Afrikaner nationalist and Israeli Zionist think and act towards the indigenous majorities among whom they live with the callous inhumanity of all who consider others to be 'inferior races' and less than human. If the Israeli rulers can claim to have avoided some of the more blatant excesses of apartheid and white baasskap in their conduct towards non-Jews (and even dark-skinned Jews suffer various forms of discrimination) it must be added that they not only dispossessed the Arabs of their land but actually terrorised millions into exile from the country.

It is worthwile noting that the demands of capitalist development in Israel are drawing the Zionist State closer and closer to the South African position. The evergrowing need for labour power has caused certain circles to seriously consider incorporating hundreds of thousands of Arabs from the occupied areas into the economy. It is these circles that are pushing for annexation and/or the setting up of some sort of autonomous Arab state (a Bantustan) out of the occupied areas. Others believe that continued immigration will resolve the problem; for them the continued expulsion of the Palestine Arab people, the continued 'ingathering of the exiles' with hypocritical and slanderous cries of 'let my people go' to the USSR are the best means of preserving the Jewish bourgeois State. Both sections are expansionist; both sections are united in serving US imperialism without whose aid the bankruptcy of the State would become apparent overnight; both sections are more and more taking up positions identical to those of the South African ruling class.

Reasons of space preclude a full discussion of anti-Arab discrimination in Israel. The most detailed study, *The Arabs In Israel* by the lawyer Sabri Jiryis (English Edition: The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1968) deals with the position up to and including 1966 and is required reading for those wanting to know how 'liberal' Zionist policy really is. The Arabs in Israel have lived for years under the shadow of 'Military Rule' based on a set of 150 odd regulations inherited from the British Mandate Authority, every bit as oppressive as the South African Apartheid laws. Restrictions on the movement of individuals, of whole villages and the entire Arab community; detention without trial; 'resettlement' of villagers; suppression of movements seeking self-determination for the Arab community; bannings and banishments; inferior educational, social welfare, housing etc.; the closing of certain (the more skilled, governmental) avenues of employment—all these and more have been and are the lot of the Arab people in Israel.

To those who resist or protest, the penalties and savage repression are closely parallel to the methods of Balthazar Vorster. A statement by Communist M.P.'s Vilner, Toubi and Habibi *(Information Bulletin,* Communist Party of

Israel, March 1970) lists the names of 44 Arab Communists, lawyers, members of municipal councils and others restricted to their home towns or villages, many of them under house-arrest at night and made to report daily at a police station. One such order reads:

> *Defence Regulations (Emergency); 1945*
> *Limitation Order*
>
> By virtue of the authority vested in me in accordance with Regulations 6(2) and 109(1) of the Defence Regulations (Emergency), 1945, and my other authorities in accordance the aforesaid regulations, and whereas I am certain that this is necessary for public security in Israel and for the defence of the State of Israel, I order hereby that:-
>
> OTHMAN SILMAN ABDUL RAHMAN ABU-RAS-TAIBEH
>
> will not be in any place of the State of Israel, except the closed CENTRAL district in its boundaries as defined in the closing order (CENTRAL district) 1 (76), year 5721 - 1961, unless, in accordance with the instructions of this order, a personal permit is issued by me or on my behalf. Validity of this order from *JANUARY 1, 70 to AUGUST 15, 70 Given today December 7, 69*
> (-)
> Rehoboam Ze'evi, General
> Commander Central Command
> and Military Commander Central Command

ISRAEL AND AFRICA

> *In view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine, and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declares its support for the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and calls for the implementation of the United Nations' resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.*

This decision of the historic Bandung Conference in 1955, could only be regarded as a major 'set-back for Israel' by the Zionists and their supporters. 'Implementation of the United Nations' resolutions on Palestine' would have meant recognition of the State of Israel and the realisation by the Palestine

Arab people of their right to nationhood as provided for in the 1947 UN Partition Plan. This was unacceptable to the Zionists. It would have meant the end for their plan to create a 'Greater Israel'. It would have deprived them of a valuable propaganda weapon in the mobilising of funds for the 'embattled state'. In rejecting this call of 15 years ago for a 'peaceful settlement' the Zionists were also ensuring (then, as today with their rejection of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967) that the Middle East remained a 'troubled area' in which imperialism would be able to maintain its influence and interests through armed intervention, direct or indirect, to 'protect' the 'fledgling state' and throttle the developing Arab Revolution.

Following the 1956 attack on the UAR the Zionist state found itself even more isolated. To overcome their isolation the Israeli rulers embarked on a 'massive effort in technical assistance to Afro-Asia'. Some features of this 'massive effort' have been noted in a recent article by Efrem Sigel in the magazine *Africa Report* (February, 1970).

Israel's rulers regard the African continent as part of the 'second ring' of countries around Israel (the 'first ring' being the Arab states), and the Jewish state considers it vital to maintain not only normal diplomatic contacts but mutual co-operation with as many as possible. Israel has diplomatic missions in 26 African countries, plays host to nearly 500 African students a year, and has 265 development experts at work from Ethiopia to the Ivory Coast. About $4 million a year is today spent on development assistance to the African countries. The Foreign training Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Histradut's Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and Co-operation run short courses in agricultural extension, community development and co-operative movements attended by African students. All expenses for these courses plus those for 100 or so full-time university students are paid by the Foreign Ministry. 'Organisation and motivation' rather than 'direct loans or grants' are favoured by the Israelis.

All this

> holds 'enormous possibilities' for the expansion of Israeli commerce, according to an expert in the Economic Division of the Foreign Ministry. Total trade amounted to $57 million in 1968, a gain of 10 per cent from the previous year. Preliminary figures for 1969 indicate another 10 per cent increase. In 1968, more than two thirds of Israeli exports of $27 million went to Southern and Eastern Africa. The closing of the Suez Canal after the June 1967 war has been of some help in promoting Israeli trade with countries like Uganda, which find themselves more cut off from traditional sources of supply in Europe.

Peace with the first ring of (Arab) states around her, except on Zionism's terms, has, as already noted, never been considered by Israel's rulers. It became necessary therefore Ben Gurion told the Knesset (24.10.60) to acquire 'the friendship and sympathy of nations near and far...to break the wall of hatred and boycott that surrounds...' That Zionism's constant trampling underfoot of the rights of the Palestine Arab people was the cause for the existence of this 'wall' was well known to Israel's rulers—to overcome this obstacle mountains of honeyed words were poured out, and gestures such as voting against apartheid at the UN were indulged in. Declared Ben Gurion:

> Israel had been granted the great historic privilege—which is therefore also a duty—of assisting backward and primitive peoples to improve themselves, develop and advance, thus helping to solve the gravest problem of the twentieth century...the problem of the dangerous gap between Asia and Africa on the one hand and Europe and America (and Australia) on the other...

But, 'Israel's restless surge into Africa' had another source. Brecher (op. cit. pp 147-8) points out:-

> ...the desire to serve as a bridge between the former colonial powers of the West and former dependent territories. The possession of Western skills, without the stigma of colonialism, fits Israel for a key role of channelling aid from the West which might be suspected if granted directly. The Israeli effort to secure admission to the Common Market and Ben Gurion's visits to France, the Low Countries and Scandanavia, were partly directed to this end.

That US imperialism endorses, finances and sponsors this 'outward looking policy' cannot be doubted. Imperialism's aim of retaining post-independence Africa within the capitalist world system and 'of undermining revolutionary movements which threaten Western hegemony' has taken many forms: direct and indirect armed intervention, staging of putches, the training, bribing and corrupting of less stable elements within the national movements, ideological subversion, economic pressure through the manipulation of world market prices etc. Africa has experienced all of them and the State of Israel has participated in all these activities.

Israel held certain special advantages for US imperialism—a new State that had emerged out of bitter struggles with British imperialism, and could boast of rapid economic development. Of equal importance was the aura of 'socialism' that surrounded the Israeli Kibbutz. The imperialists figured that Israeli example could be used to show that 'a non-Communist' way out of the colonialist legacy of backwardness could be followed. In fact, more nonsense has been written about the Kibbutz than any other feature of Israeli society. Kibbutzim are communal agricultural settlements. Membership is voluntary, and members decide policy—development, investment, administration officials etc.—at general meetings. This 'free association' of individuals has bewitched all sorts of 'dreamers after the better life'. The freedom is illusory. The 'free association' arose out of the impossibility of 'making things pay' in the early days of Zionist colonisation. The majority of the 300 odd Kibbutzim are hopelessly in debt to banks and money lenders, and without subsidies channelled through the Jewish Agency would be bankrupt. The Zionist organisations keep them going because of the value they serve as instruments for settlement of the ever-expanding new areas. They cannot meet their own labour needs and production is maintained through injections of free labour power supplied by the Army. At least 6 months of the conscript's 'service' is performed on Kibbutzim. Not being able to compete on the agricultural free market many Kibbutzim have established light industrial concerns—the workers being drawn from nearby towns and villages. For these workers the Kibbutz is no different from any other capitalist employer.

As the pro-American Arnold Rivkin explained *(Africa and the West,* Praeger 1961)

> Israel's role as a third force might also be reinforced by imaginative use of the third country technique. A free world wishing to enlarge its assistance flow to Africa might channel some part of it through Israel because of Israel's special qualifications and demonstrated acceptability to the Africans...Africa saw in Israel a relatively neutral source without any of the possible ideological implications which might attach from the West... The Israeli model may well prove to be a sort of economic 'third force'—an alternative differing from the Western pattern, but certainly more compatible with free world interests than any communist model.

Neither the full extent nor the source of the funds for the aid programme have ever been revealed by the Israelis. Quite obviously the 'third country' technique involving the US, France, Britain and West Germany has and is being used, as are direct grants from such organisations as the AFL-CIO and British TUC.

Direct economic investment has been limited not only by Israel's shortage of investment capital, but because of shrewd political and economic reasoning. Taking the form of minority share-holding contracts, these are 'limited to a period of five years at the end of which the local majority shareholders are given the option of buying the Israeli interest out..' This tends to minimise the suspicions of the Africans, but equally as important these

> ...joint ventures have enabled Israeli companies to enter new markets with relatively small capital investment and under the benevolent protection of the governments of the developing countries. Since in many of these countries domestic markets are closely guarded by long-established expatriate firms, the Israeli firms might have found it difficult to establish themselves without partnerships. (Laufer *Israel and the Developing Countries,* New York 1968).

This technique also allows the Israeli neo-colonialists a much higher degree of mobility of capital for the limited funds available to them.

Apart, therefore, from acting as a 'channel' for imperialist funds, Israeli 'aid' serves the neo-colonial ambitions of its own ruling capitalists.

> It is in the sphere of 'military assistance' that Israel comes into its own with sensitive and highly-specialised military and police-intelligence training. A myriad of programmes quitely provide African states the type of military and police know-how required to build up effective internal security forces designed to protect those neo-colonialist governments propped up and 'developed' by US imperialism from being overthrown by their populations.

(Quoted from *Israel: Imperialist Mission in Africa.* I am indebted to this important document, compiled by the Africa Research Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts for many of the facts in this section). Here are but a few examples:

Congo-Kinshasa

1963: 243 Congolese paratroopers training in Israel
1964: 100 more Congolese receive training from Israeli advisers in Congo (K) itself
1968: 35 more paratroopers trained by Israelis

Malawi

Banda's paramilitary organisation of 500 to 700 Young Pioneers instructed by 4 Israelis

Chad

In 1967 2 Israeli 'advisers' killed in counterinsurgency operations with Chad Army against Chad National Liberation Front.

Ethiopia

Here Israel has set up a military school in Decamare, Eritrea, training Ethiopian soldiers to engage the Eritrean liberation forces. Already 5,000 soldiers have passed through the hands of a group of Israeli officers headed by Colonel Ben Nathaw. The Israelis also train the Ethiopian Marine Commando Forces; they replaced the US 'special forces' after the abortive coup by US-trained Ethiopian officers.

Guinea-Bissau

In a statement, Louis Cabral of the Political Bureau of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (P.A.I.G.C.) said: 'Regarding the role played by US imperialism, Zionism and NATO in support of Portugal, I would like to remind you...(that)...most of the arms (of

> the Portuguese) are Israeli. Portugal has a strong alliance with Israel...Israel's action is not limited to giving the Portuguese the means they need to destroy our people. Israel is also trying to sabotage our struggle by using small groups of people originally from our country who call themselves nationalists and who, nevertheless, are agents of Portuguese colonialism. These people are sent to Israel and we have reports of Israel-trained agents trying to infiltrate our ranks'.

Here then is how the government of Israel carries out the 'duty' expressed by Ben Gurion of 'assisting backward and primitive peoples' (how clearly these arrogant words express the colonialist and racialist thinking of the Zionists!) 'to improve themselves'.

Here too, we see how the penurious State of Israel, which could never sustain its own economy, still less dispense 'aid' abroad, without the massive inflow of US dollars and funds from Zionists abroad, is able to pose in the role of a 'benefactor' and patron. It is merely acting as a pipe-line for the US and other imperialist powers to penetrate African countries.

It is time to rip off the mask of benevolent neutrality which Israel tries to present in Africa. As Ali Yata, redoubtable Moroccan leader pointed out at the 1966 Cairo Seminar *Africa: National and Social Revolution* the African working people must recognise their enemies. For too long, failure to do just that has driven a wedge between Africans in the north—victims of ferocious Zionists aggression—and those to the south who, by and large, have failed to rally to their support.

In alliance with the imperialists and the South African white racists, Israel's aim is to hold back the tide of progress, preserve Africa as a stronghold of profit and privilege, and perpertuate the exploitation of the oppressed masses.

Tel Aviv, May 1970

'...And his deathless name shall still lead us from strength to strength; and revolution after revolution shall be monuments to his memory.'

LENIN'S FIRST NEWSPAPER

'THE SPARK' THAT GREW INTO A GREAT FLAME

D. IVON JONES.

Editorial Note
This article was one of a series written on the occasion of the death of Lenin, by David Ivon Jones, a founder and leader of the Communist Party of South Africa, whose representative he then was on the Executive Vommittee of the Communist International. We reprint it here not only as a tribute in Lenin Centenary Year, but also as an excellent example of Jones's breadth of vision, depth of understanding and lucidity of style. At that time the work he refers to in this article as What Must We Do? has not yet appeared in English—it has since gone through innumerable editions as the famous *What Is To Be Done—the more correct version of its title, though we have left Jones's version as he wrote it. The article* appeared in *The International (Johannesburg): the present text is from The Communist Review (London) Vol V, No. 2, June 1924.*



LENIN'S newspaper, *Iskra, (The Spark)* formed the starting point for the formation of an organised party of the proletariat in Russia, when the words 'Menshevik' and 'Bolshevik' had not yet been coined In order to understand the character and purpose of the journal, it is necessary to go back a few years.

When Lenin appeared in Petrograd in 1894, and began to form Social-Democratic groups of workers and intellectuals, the Social-Democrtic idea, which was then synonymous with revolutionary Marxism, had already been disseminated in Russia for about ten years, but only among isolated individuals here and there. A number of Russian Marxists, prominent among whom were Plekhanov and Axelrod, had formed the 'group for the emancipation of Labour,' in Switzerland. They worked, as it were, in the absence of a workers' movement, when it was still a question of theory, as far as Russia was concerned. They perforce confined themselves to the literary task of popularising the Marxian principles among the Russian revolutionaries, who were in a state of disillusionment and disappointment at the failure of the 'Narodvoltzi' (Populist) creed, which based it hopes upon the peasant.

Lenin started the period of action in Russian Social-Democracy. But, he also, most effectively of all, incarnated Marxism in the flesh of actual Russian economic conditions. This he did in his controversy with the 'narodniki.' He left a monument to this controversy in his masterly work,. *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.*

But Lenin not only wrote. With him theory served to give replies to the problems arising out of the struggle. He formed groups of workers to organise agitation in the various workshops of Petrograd. The agitation among the workers took the form of issuing leaflets in connection with a certain factory, flagellating the abuses and oppressions, the petty fines, etc., to which the workers were subjected. But Lenin's group not only advanced particular economic demands, but also the struggle for the overthrow of Czarism, thus placing the workers in the forefront of the struggle for political freedom. And the workers readily responded. A wave of strikes dated from this time. The workers finally demonstrated their capacity for political struggle, which was of vast importance in winning over the revolutionary intelligentsia to Marxism.

Needless to say, the agitation had to be carried on under the severest conspirative conditions. The growing working class revolt roused the forces of the Czarist police to action, and, at the end of 1895, practically the whole of Lenin's group, the 'Group for the emancipation of the working class,' was arrested, including Lenin himself. In 1897, Lenin was exiled to Siberia. There, however, he managed to continue his literary work, his controversy with the legal 'narodniki,' besides writing on the urgent tasks of the Social-Democrats in Russia in the light of the experience gained in the first attempts in Petrograd.

While Lenin was in exile, Social-Democratic groups were being formed in all the large cities of Russia, and an attempt was made to hold the first congress at Minsk, in 1898. But, as Lenin afterwards showed, the young Social Democrats, were as yet inexperienced in conspirative organisation. and the central organisations set up by the Congress were broken up by the police as soon as formed. Nothing remained but the Manifesto of the Congress. So that there was still no organised Party. It remained an idea, a trend. There was no co-ordination among the groups. Each was a law to itself and each had a different interpretation of the Social-Democratic programme, tactics and methods of struggle. This was the period of the groups or circles.

Lenin returned from exile in 1900. In the five years since his arrest, the elemental uprising of the workers had taken a mass character. This disquieted Lenin, even while it filled him with confidence in the working class, as all elemental uprisings without conscious direction disquieted him. He saw the mass movement going ahead of the conscious Social-Democratic movement, and he sounded the alarm. He saw much that was contrary to Marxism in the tactics and teachings of the young groups. A certain vulgarisation of Marxism, a kind of 'I.W.W.'ism, had taken hold among the revolutionary youth during these five years.

This trend was known as 'economism.' The 'economists' declared the economic struggle to be paramount. 'Politics follow economics,' they said. 'Leave politics to the liberal bourgeoisie; and all this talk about the overthrow of Czarism is not the concern of the workers. Talk to the workers about matters that promise palpable results. Too much ideology, too much theory, etc., etc.,' How familiar all this is to any Party worker no matter in what part of the world he may be! Lenin sensed a great danger in this trend. With the air of being ultra-working class the economists reduced working class politics into a tool of the bourgeoisie. For many at that time wanted the revolution who were not of the working class movement, but saw in the working class a force to be exploited politically. The liberal bourgeoisie desired revolution of a sort. The petty bourgeoisie desired revolution. Whose revolution it was going to be, whether the proletariat should be a tool in the service of the bourgeoisie, or whether it should retain the lead in the revolution, depended on the correct proletarian tactics and the correct methods of organisation in these critical days. The revolutionary intelligentsia were prone to say: 'The proletariat is necessary for the revolution.' Plekhanov corrected them from his Geneva study: 'No, on the contrary, *the revolution is necessary for the proletariat.'* Such were the 'economists,' consciously or unconsciously reducing the role of the proletariat to an appendage of the liberal bourgeoisie.

Lenin now saw himself obliged to carry forward the theoretical struggle from the domain of programme (controversy with the narodniki) to the domain of tactics and methods of organisation, namely, the fight with the 'economists' within the Social-Democratic movement. On his return from exile Lenin, and a few others who held similar views, met at Pskov to consider the needs of the movement. It was decided to start an all-Russian Social-Democratic newspaper. There had been several previous attempts made to start a paper. Some had had a short-lived existence before being discovered and suppressed; others, like the *Rabochi Dyelo* (*'Workers' Cause'*), the first paper printed by Lenin's group in 1895, had been seized by the police before leaving the press. The only hope of success was to establish what Lenin called a base of operations beyond the reach of the Czarist police, that is, abroad, and thereto establish a newspaper which would be an ideological guide for the movement, gathering the various groups together round the true Marxist tactics and methods of organisation. For this purpose, Lenin was selected to go abroad and establish contact with the Plekhanov group, enlisting their aid in the work.

In this task Lenin had brilliant success. He established the now famous newspaper, *Iskra,* (*The Spark*), and the *Iskra* organisation for the dissemination of the paper. The paper became not only a theoretical guide, but an organisational centre, to which group after group adhered, to form the basis for an All-Russian Party of the proletariat.

But, needless to say, *Iskra* met with considerable opposition from the 'economists' within the movement. For, was it not formed to wage uncompromising war on Economism, which exalted the immaturity of the movement into a considered policy? In its first announcement, the paper declared: '*Before we unite, and in order that we unite, it is necessary first of all resolutely and definitely to divide.*' Here, however, there was no question of splitting any organisation, for a centrally organised party did not yet exist. It was *Iskra's* task to form it. But, first of all, it was necessary to delimit, fix boundaries, define the Social-Democratic method and those who belonged to it, and label those who departed from it; separating the tares from the wheat. And the tares at this time were the 'economists.'

Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod and others were on the *Iskra* editorial committee. But *Iskra* was essentially Lenin's paper. Of all these, Lenin alone had clear, impelling ideas as to what the movement needed. He put forward the celebrated idea of an '*organisation of professional revolutionaries.*' He had seen group after group broken up by the police, every forward movement thwarted by wholesale arrests because of what Lenin called a 'tinkering' view of the incredibly difficult task of counteracting the political police. A broken up group, having no link with a central organisation, left no trace whereby its activities could be speedily revived. Lenin demanded a centrally directed organisation of comrades as scientifically equipped as the police in the art of conspiracy—'professional revolutionaries' the ironsides of an All-Russian Party, of the Proletariat. *Iskra* also elaborated in detail the plan of such a Party, and not only proposed this, but proceeded to carry its ideas into practice, gathering round itself group after group of adherents in the various industrial centres of Russia.

In 1902, a year after starting *Iskra,* Lenin issued his epoch-making brochure, entitled, *What Must We Do?* This he describes as a synopsis of the *Iskra* tactics and methods of organisation. The book became a veritable storm centre in Russian Social Democracy, not only because of its campaign against 'economism,' but also because it laid down principles of Party organisation which went much further than the fight against 'economism.' *What Must We Do?* cleared 'economism' off the field, but it raised new issues, a new conflict on a higher plane, which a year later crystallised in the division of the movement into Menshevism and Bolshevism.

Meanwhile 'economism,' degrading the political role of the proletariat, found its kindred expression in Bernstein's revisionism. At first glance the latter had little in common with the slogans of 'economism.' But Lenin branded it as the Russian form of opportunism. The 'economists' chafed at the rigours of 'orthodox' Marxism, and demanded, like their German confrere, 'freedom of criticism.' This brought from Lenin a retort characteristic of the uncompromising revolutionary; '*People who are really convinced that they carry science a step forward would demand, not equal freedom for the new theory along with the old one, but the substitution of the old by the new,*' and, in the first chapter of *What Must We Do?* he adds: 'Oh, yes, messieurs, you are free to invite, and, not only to invite, but to go where you please, even to the morass; we even think that the bog is your proper place, and we are prepared to lend you every support for your migration thereto.' Lenin believed in giving the confirmed opportunist a push to the right!

At this time, using the terminology of the French revolution, *Iskra* declared the existence of the Mountain and the Gironde in the Russian proletarian movement. Indeed, Plekhanov, some time before Lenin's arrival in the 'emigration,' had broken with the 'Union for the Emancipation of Labour,' because of its 'economism' and had formed the 'League of Social Democrats.' But Lenin does not seem to have suspected (or else deemed it unwise to reveal his suspicions), that the final cleavage should take place on a line between him and his *Iskra* colleagues, Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod, and others. But this amazing 'right-about-face' to opportunism, constituting one of the most striking studies in the psychology of menshevism, must form the subject of a separate article, devoted to the Menshevik split.

What Must We Do? in spite of the familiarising of Leninism by the Communist International, has till much that is new and startling to the English reader, and it is to be hoped that these early Lenin brochures will soon be published in the English language. It is inevitable that we should become more and more familiar with their historical allusions to our classic history. For Lenin was wont to say, 'It is an axiom of the Marxiam dialectic *that there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete.* And one may say that what the *Communist Manifesto* is to Marxism in its first phase, so is *What Must We Do?* to Marxism in its second phase, the phase of action, in its Leninist phase. Take the second chapter of this brochure, entitled 'The Elemental and the Conscious.' Opportunism, at first taking the form in Russia of 'economism,' magnified the role of the elemental or the spontaneous in the workers' mass movement. The 'economists' accused *Iskra* of exaggerating the factor of consciousness (*vide* Engels' definition of the Party as 'the conscious expression of an unconscious process.') The 'economists' opposed what they termed their 'tactic-process' to *Iskra's* tactic-plan. Lenin was filled with profound uneasiness at every spontaneous uprising of the workers in the absence of mature party guidance. The backwardness of the Party disquieted him. He invented a special nickname for the 'economist' tactic—'hang-on-the-tailism,' which is used to-day in the Russian movement. He accused the 'economists' by their genuflections before the 'elemental' of wanting the party to be forever 'studying the hindquarters of the proletariat,' of making the principle of the class struggle an excuse for waiting on events, instead of forestalling them, dominating them. '*Every exaggeration of the elemental, and depreciation of the conscious, factor in the Labour movement is a strengthening of bourgeois influences among the workers..* He denied the current impression that Socialist consciousness comes to the workers inevitably through their conflicts with individual capitalists. 'The workers by their own strength can only achieve Trade Unionist political action.' 'The spontaneous workers' movement of its own accord is capable only of forming (and it inevitably forms) trade unionism; and trade unionist political action of the working class is precisely bourgeois political action.' Lenin roundly accuses the 'economists' of an 'oblique attempt to prepare the ground for transforming the workers' movement into a tool of bourgeois democracy.' Further on Lenin devotes several pages to 'Trade Unionist *versus* Social Democratic political action,' with copious references to English Trade Unionism. Reading these chapters, one receives a flash of revelation as to why great waves of working class mass action have swept over England and receded again, leaving hardly a trace in the collective experience. For this collective experience can only be garnered by a Communist Party. This responsibility of the individual before history, the role of human initiative of the Party, is the great Leninist corrective to the conception of Marxism hitherto prevailing in the West. If the 'great man theory' be regarded as the *thesis,* and historical materialism (vulgarised) as the *antithesis,* then Leninism, the restoration of the amphasis on conscious initiative, is the *synthesis* of it all. In *What Must We Do?* we feel this power, this revolutionary driving force, permeating every phrase. He conceives the role of the revolutionary as the liquidator of outworn historical periods, the refuse of which encumbers the way. He concludes the preface to this book with the words, 'For we cannot move forward unless we finally liquidate this period (the period of the groups).'

Lenin's chief antagonist among the 'economists' was Martuinov (not to be confused with Martov). Now Martuinov is in his own person a living symbol of Lenin's driving power on history. Martuinov started his career with the 'narodniki' (the Populists) and left the 'narodniki' when their position became untenable from the attacks of Plekhanov and Lenin. He then became an exponent of 'economism' in the Social-Democratic movement. 'Economism' in its turn was smashed under Lenin's sledge-hammer blows, and

Martuinov had to move forward to a more consistent position. Later, he took the Menshevik side in the great division, and even became its official theoretician. Last year, after twenty years, Martuinov unconditionally capitulated to his old opponent and signallised the complete downfall of Menshevism by going over to the Communist International. 'Thou hast conquered, oh, Galilean!'

Before leaving the subject of 'Elemental *versus* Conscious Action,' let us indulge ourselves in one more quotation: 'Only the most vulgar understanding of Marxism, or the 'understanding' of it in the spirit of Strouvism, could engender the idea that the upsurging of the spontaneous mass movement of the workers relieves us of the duty of forming such an efficient organisation as that of the *zemlevolio,* nay, of forming an incomparably more efficient organisation of revolutionaries. On the contrary, this mass movement precisely *imposes* upon us this duty; for the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat does not become a real *class struggle* until it is directed by a strong organisation of revolutionaries.'

What Must We Do? devotes much space to the question of party democracy; and the recent discussion in the Russian Communist Party can only be fully comprehended in the light of these early works of Lenin. In the days of *Iskra* it was a question of party democracy in a severely conspirative organisation, but the Leninist axioms retain their force. 'A revolutionary organisation,' he says, 'never could and never can with the best of intentions, install the broad democratic principle.' Primitive democratic notions, such as the one that a people's newspaper should be edited directly by the people, were rife among the revolutionary youth, as a revulsion from absolutism. Lenin had to fight against these primitive notions in order to establish his organisation of 'ironsides.' 'The broad democratic principle is impossible without full publicity.' Lenin was a sworn enemy of the principle expressed in the words 'from the bottom up.' He demanded that the Party be organised from the top down. Not on democracy, but on the mutual faith of comrades. *'Vulgar democratic tendencies in the Party reflect bourgeois democratic party tendencies.'*

Lenin published a reprint of *What Must We Do?* in 1907, during the temporary spell of political freedom under the Duma. In the preface to that edition, he refers to the organisation of professional revolutionaries as having well completed its work and planted the party on impregnable foundations. In the same connection, he welcomes the introduction of the elective principle in the party organisation owing to the greater freedom of action. But that freedom was short-lived. The party had to return underground. And it is only now that the Party, emerging from the period of civil war, has been able to apply 'workers' democracy' to the Party apparatus. Nevertheless, Comrade Lenin warned the Party against 'vulgar democracy,' which is only bourgeois democracy, excluded from all other avenues, knocking at the door of the Party.

Who said that Lenin had no humour? His was a versatile, many-sided genius. *What Must We Do?* like all his brochures, teems with humourous asides, a certain pawky Scotch humour which keeps close to the gist of the matter. He refers for example to Soubatov, the Czarist agent, who was known to be in favour of legalising trade unions, and who instigated strikes, Lenin said in effect, 'All right, we'll gain from it in spite of the tares in the wheat, we don't want to grow wheat in flower pots.'

The spirit that animated Lenin was a pride in the working class, unbounded faith in the proletariat. He denounced any and every attempt to degrade its political role. 'The consciousness of the working class cannot be a truly political one unless the workers respond to every case of oppression, violence and abuse, *no matter to what class they are applied.'*

(p. 78). When the Czar's government drafted 183 students of Kiev University into the army, in punishment for insubordination, *Iskra* called for workers' demonstrations of protest. And the workers responded, a fact which Lenin exultantly shows to the 'economists.'

This exalted view of the role of the proletariat is balanced by a sense of tremendous responsibility.

> 'Our backwardness,' he says, 'will be inevitably taken advantage of by more agile, more energetic 'revolutionaries' outside Social Democracy; and the workers, no matter how boldly and energetically they may fight the police and the soldiers, no matter how revolutionary they may act, will be only a force in support of these 'revolutionaries'; they will be just the rear-guard of bourgeois democracy, instead of being the Social-Democratic (*read* Communist) advance guard.'

He hurls the word 'tinkers' again at the 'economist' defenders of party backwardness. And then, all at once, we have another Lenin, the master, unsparing above all towards himself.

> Don't be aggrieved with me for this harsh word,' he says. 'For, in so far as it is a question of unpreparedness, I apply it to myself. I worked in a group which set before itself a very broad, all-embracing task, and to all of us members of that group came the torturing feeling that we were nothing but tinkers, at an historic moment when it was possible to say, adapting a well-known phrase: 'Give us an organisation of revolutionaries and we will conquer Russia.' And, since then, the more I recall that bitter feeling of shame, which I then experienced, the more does my choler rise against those false Social-Democrats who, by their preachings debase the revolutionary name; against those who do not understand that our task is not to condone the debasement of a revolutionist into a tinker, but to raise the tinker to be a revolutionist.'

These lines were written many years before the October revolution, but, in reading *What Must We Do?* one feels that the critical days of the October revolution were not the days of October. It would have been too late in 1917 to form that ironclad Party—steeled in two revolutions, and in innumerable contests with the Czar's police—capable of leading the proletariat along the inconceivably difficult paths of the proletarian dictatorship. And this titanic struggle of the Russian proletariat, a struggle which has also cleared the path of the Western revolution, was only possible as the fruits of an equally titanic *theoretical* struggle waged by Lenin in the first years of the century. And Lenin, in *What Must We Do?* pierces into this future, as is his wont. Marvellous prophet—in the power of his revolutionary logic the future blends with the present in one iron inevitability. He has just been quoting Engels on the leading role of the German proletariat in the international movement, and says:

> Before the Russian workers now stand immeasurably heavier trials, now stands a struggle with monsters, compared with which the exceptional laws in a constitutional country are a mere bagatelle. History has placed before us the immediate task, which is the most revolutionary of all the *immediate* tasks of the proletariat of any country. The realisation of this task, the destruction of the most powerful buttress, not only of European, but also (we may now say) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the advance guard of the international revotionary proletariat. And we have a right to expect that we shall achieve this honourable role, already earned by our predecessors of the seventies, if we can inspire our movement which is a thousand times deeper and wider than theirs, with the same unsparing devotion and energy.'

And so it came to pass. Whatever Lenin set himself to do he achieved. And his deathless name shall still lead us on from strength to strength; and revolution after revolution shall be monuments to his memory.

ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Z. NKOSI

The slogan 'one man one vote' which is supposed to lie at the heart of the democratic process is inoperative in South Africa, where political power is vested in the 3,500,00 Whites out of the total population of approximately 20 million.

The House of Assembly which was elected in the last general election on April 22 consists of 166 Whites elected by and responsible to Whites only. Speaking at an election meeting in Durban on March 13, 1970, Prime Minister Vorster said: *'South African nationhood is for the Whites only. That is how I see it, that is how you see it, and that is how we will see it for the future:'*

His Minister of Information, Dr Connie Mulder, a strong-man type seen by many as the next Prime Minister of South Africa (if it stays Nationalist for much longer), said at another meeting in Queenstown on March 7, 1970: 'Let me say to you unequivocally that in terms of National Party policy, we reserve Parliament for Whites—and Whites only'. The White man would always rule in White South Africa, said Dr Mulder.

And the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Dr Koornhof, said at another election meeting on March 16, 1970: 'In White South Africa only the White man is "baas" and the Nationalist Party will maintain this position forever with force, if necessary'.

For the first time since Union in 1910, the House of Assembly now provides no representation of any kind for any section of the Non-White majority in the country's central legislature.

African representation in Parliament was abolished by the so-called Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, and Coloured representation by the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1968. The Indians have never had any Parliamentary representation and are, of course, not to get any.

Nor is it only at the Parliamentary level that Non-Whites are denied legislative powers. They have equally no representation in the Provincial Councils and in three out of the four Provinces, as well as in South West Africa, they have no representation on municipal councils. Only in the Cape Province does the common-roll franchise in municipal elections exist—an anachronistic survival from the pre-Union non racial franchise of the old Cape Colony first introduced with representative government in 1853. This non-racial franchise is not, and never was, based on the principle of one man one vote, but on property and educational qualifications, altered from time to time to ensure that effective power always remained in White hands. Nevertheless, in some local Councils in the Western Cape and also in Port Elizabeth a handful of Non-Whites have sat side by side with Whites in local councils.

To the Nationalist Government this is a negation of their apartheid policy, and during the first 1970 session of Parliament the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, announced that Non-Whites throughout the Cape Province are to lose their common roll franchise for municipal and other bodies. Within two years, he said, the White Parliamentary roll will be used as the basis of this franchise. Vorster said he regarded the step as the next logical move in the Government's policy for the Coloured people, and that discussions to this end had already taken place with the Cape Executive Council of the Provincial Council.

Vorster also claimed that discussions had taken place with the Coloured Representative Council, and read out a letter from the CRC chairman, Government-appointed Mr Tom Swartz, stating that the present non-racial system was an outmoded hybrid which was more of a hindrance that a help to the Coloured people. Swartz expressed support for the abolition of the non-racial franchise in the Cape and the substitution of purely Coloured bodies in Coloured local areas.

It only remains to be said that when Africans and Coloureds in the Cape province were registered on a separate voters' roll for elections, and also in those elections where a non-racial franchise was operative, not a single pro-apartheid candidate was ever returned by Non-White voters. Those members of the Nationalist Party who submitted their policies to the Non-White electorate were decisively rejected.

It is through the political segregation of the South African people, and the enforced exclusion of the Non-Whites from the corridors of power, that Vorster hopes to procure an expression of Non-White support for apartheid and the so-called policy of 'separate development'. He hopes that a twisted and thwarted non-White nationalism may be developed through 'separate development' and separate institutions in such a way as to justify the exercise of White Supremacy in what he calls White South Africa.

Has this policy any hope of success?

AFRICAN ELECTIONS

In place of representation in Parliament, the Africans were offered the device of Bantustan, in terms of which each of the ten African ethnic groups would be given its own parliament in its own homeland. Theoretically, that is. In practice, not a single African ethnic group has yet been granted either its own homeland or its independence. The Nationalist Government points to the Transkei as its first Bantustan, but it is important to remember that the Transkei is not the homeland of the whole Xhosa people, of whom at least 400,000 live in the Ciskei, which has its own Territorial Authority separate from the Transkei, and it is Government policy that the two should not be integrated.

The Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 purported to 'confer self-government on the Bantu resident in or deriving from the Transkei'. The Transkei Legislative Assembly consists of 109 members—the five Paramount Chiefs and 59 district chiefs holding office automatically, with only 45 members elected by the registered voters of the Transkei. In the firt elections held under the new constitution—in 1963—880,425 Xhosa registered as voters, 466,107 of them being women. They were estimated to constitute 90 per cent or more of the total number eligible. Of these voters, about 610,000 were in the Transkei and 270,000 outside.

The elections was contested by two main groups, one led by Chief Kaiser Matanzima, supporting the Government's Bantustan policies; and the other led by Paramount Chief Victor Poto, standing for the retention of the Transkei as an integral portion of a single united South Africa. Because candidates stood as individuals and not on a political party basis, it is impossible to assess the percentage of votes cast for each group. After the election results were announced, Paramount Chief Poto claimed the support of 38 of the 45 elected members, and Chief Matanzima was reported to have conceded at least 35 seats. It was generally accepted that the overwhelming majority of voters had supported candidates whom they regarded as Poto supporters.

MATANZIMA AS CHIEF MINISTER.

Nevertheless, in closed session of the new Assembly Matanzima was elected Chief Minister by 54 votes to 49 (two members spoilt their papers, one chief had just died, one was away, one ill and one abstained). Accepting Poto's claim as accurate, the line-up was probably as follows.

	Matanzima	Poto
Chiefs	47	11
Elected members	7	38

In January 1964 Poto formed his group into the Democratic Party. Its membership was open to all races and it stood for 'democracy and multi-racialism for all in the Transkei and, eventually, all in the rest of South Africa'. In April 1964 Matanzima formed his Transkei National Independence Party, which stood for separate development and opposed 'multi-racialism'.

During all these years, the Transkei emergency regulations remained in force, and Matanzima did not hesitate to invoke them against hundreds of his opponents, who were detained without trial for long periods, banned and banished or driven out of their homes which were burnt down behind them. Some members of the Democratic Party crossed the floor to join him, some broke away to form the splinter Transkei People's Freedom Party.

By October 1968, just before the second election, the party affiliation of the 45 elected members was estimated to be: TNIP, 15; Democratic Party, 27; Freedom Party, 2; and one independent. 56 chiefs supported the TNIP and 8 the Democratic Party.

The second Transkei election was held on Ocotober 23, 1968. During 1967 the Transkei Constitution Act had been amended to enable elections to be held on a district rather than on a regional basis. In the 1963 election the 45 elected seats had been allocated between the 9 electoral divisions in accordance with the number of registered voters in each.

The 1967 Act necessitated the complete re-registration of all Transkeian voters both in the Transkei and in the Republic and the preparation of separate rolls for males and females for each of the 26 districts of the Transkei. The total number of voters registered was 907,778, of whom only 840,577 were able to cast a vote because in two districts—Butterworth and St Marks with 67,201 votes between them—candidates had been returned unopposed. No details are available of the number of male and female voters on the roll, or the number resident in the Transkei and the Republic. Of the 840,577 voters who were able to go to the polls, only 450,325, or 53.6 per cent, did so. (Report of the Department of the Interior, Transkei Government, for the years 1967 and 1968.)

According to the Johannesburg *Financial Mail* of November 8, 1968, the votes were cast as follows:

T.N.I.P.	43.8 per cent
Democratic Party	35.8 per cent
Freedom Party	2.4 per cent
Independents	18 per cent

The allocation of seats in the new Assembly after the election was:

	Chiefs	Elected	Total
T.N.I.P.	56	28	84
Democratic Party	8	14	22
Independent	-	3	3
	64	45	109

To sum up—Matanzima enjoys the support of only about 200,000 of the voters who went to the poll—or roughly one quarter of the total electorate, allowing for the two uncontested seats as well. Yet he controls 84 of the 109 seats in the Assembly—or four-fiths. This is democracy, Bantustan style.

LIMITATION POWERS

The Transkei Assembly is totally subordinate to the central South African Parliament and Government.

The Transkei Assembly has no control over matters pertaining to defence, internal security and foreign affairs, and has no control over White residents in the Transkei, who remain citizens of the Republic and are not eligible for the franchise in the Transkei. No White man can be arrested by a Black policeman or brought before a Black magistrate. The South African Government can veto any law passed by the Transkei Assembly, or legislate on any matter if the Transkei Assembly is reluctant to do so itself. More than half the Transkei's revenue is provided by the South African Government.

As the Minister of the Interior, Senator de Klerk, told a Nationalist Party meeting in Stilfontein on March 30 1966, the South African Government had not yet granted the Transkei a single essential right enjoyed by a sovereign independent state. It did not have the right under its constitution to possess its own army or railways. It had merely been given control over domestic matters, and every department of the Transkei Government had a White official to give it 'leadership and guardianship'.

The Transkei is the only Bantustan to have reached the stage of so-called "self-government". though others have accepted Territorial Authorities, the last being Zululand, which finally succumbed to Government pressure in March 1970. But none of the Bantustan Governments need cherish any illusions about the extent of the consitutional freedom they will ever be allowed to enjoy.

The promised independence for the Bantustans was an important issue during the South African election campaign in 1970, with both the verkrampte Herstigte Nasionale Party and the Opposition United Party furiously attacking the Government for imperilling the security of White South

Africa. Both argued that once the Bantustans became independent, they would become seedbeds of international Communism and bases for attack on White South Africa.

Cabinet Ministers in reply made it quite clear that whatever measure of independence was ultimately granted to the Bantustans—and that would only be done when the White man considered they were 'ready' for it—would be trimmed to the requirements of White South Africa. The Minister of Defence, Mr P.W.Botha, was reported to have given an undertaking that should any threat to South Africa materialise inside one of the future Bantustans, the South African Government would not hesitate to 'move in' to quell it. Mr Botha said South Africa was ready to 'move in' whether the homeland concerned was independent or not, if South Africa was threatened. This would be done in much the same way as South Africa had 'moved into' Rhodesia to fight 'terrorists'

The Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, went even further in a speech in the Johannesburg City Hall on April 16, 1970. 'If any country', he said, 'be it one of our Black territories which we are going to lead to self-determination or any other Black state in Southern Africa—uses its territory as a springboard for Communists to attack South Africa, we will do the necessary to protect South Africa's interests'.

Most aggressive was Dr P. van der Merwe, the chairman of the Nationalist Party's Foreign Affairs Committee, who said at a meeting in Camperdown on March 16 that South Africa might have to cross her borders 'to destroy her enemies'. Dr van der Merwe gave Israel as the example South Africa would follow in attacking enemies across her borders. He named Zambia and Tanzania specifically but said that 72 countries were actively participating in terrorism against South Africa.

COLOURED ELECTIONS

For the Coloured people of South Africa there is no 'homeland' or Colouredstan where they can develop 'on their own lines', as with the Africans. In place of representation in the central Parliament of South Africa, they are offered the Coloured Persons Representative Council, which will exercise certain functions of local government in the Coloured ghettoes of South Africa, and will possibly also advise on the allocation of the funds for Coloured services, including education, voted bv the House of Assembly.

The Coloured Persons Representative Council was set up by the Coloured Persons' Representative Council Amendment Act of 1968. It consists of 60 members—40 elected and 20 nominated by the Government. Every Coloured man and woman in South Africa over 21 is compelled to register as a voter on pain of a fine of R50 or 3 months imprisonment. Of the 40 elected seats, 28 are in the Cape Province, 6 in the Transvaal and 3 each in Natal and the Free State.

The first election under the Act was held on September 24, 1969. Six parties contested the election, of which only one—the Labour Party of South Africa led by Mr M.D.Arendse—stood on an anti-apartheid ticket. There were contests in only 37 of the 40 seats, as in three seats candidates of the government—supporting Federal Coloured People's Party, led by Mr Tom Swartz, who had been chairman of the Government-appointed Coloured Advisory Council, were returned unopposed.

Of the just over 600,00 registered voters only 48.7 per cent went to the polls. Polls of up to 75 per cent were registered in some of the rural constituencies, where Coloured voters had reportedly been subjected to great pressure and intimidation by employers and police. In the Cape urban constituencies, where Coloured people had previously enjoyed the vote on the common roll and still enjoy direct representation in the City Council, the polls were low. Bottom of the list was Liesbeek, with 13 per cent, and others showed a poll of only 16.4 per cent, 18.4 per cent, 19.2 per cent and 20.2 per cent.

ELECTION RESULT

The result of the election was as follows:

Parties	Votes Cast		Seats Won
	No.	%	
Labour Party of S.A.	135,204	45.3	26
Federal Coloured People's Party	90,605	30.3	11
Republican Coloured Party	30,238	10 1	1
National Coloured People's Party	23,260	7.8	1
Independent Federal Party	11,407	3.8	1
Conservative Party	3,216	1.1	-

The balance of the votes went to independents and there were a number of spoilt papers.

To sum up: the majority of Coloured voters did not vote at all. Of those who did vite although the majority supported pro-apartheid candidates, the anti-apartheid Labour Party emerged with the largest number of both votes and seats.

To secure control of the Council, the Labour Party had to win 31 seats, which it failed to do. But to make assurance doubly sure, the Government then proceeded to nominate Federal Coloured People's Party men to fill the remaining 20 seats on the Council, including 13 candidates who had been defeated in the elections. This gave the F.C.P.P. the necessary 31 votes to control the Council

Perhaps the worst insult of all was the Government's appointment of Mr Tom Swartz himself as chairman of the Council executive (the remaining four members of which are elected by the Council itself). Mr Swartz, a former compositor's assistant in Umtata, was at the time of his appointment an estate agent in Cape Town, where he was contracted by the Department of Community Development ot sell properties in Coloured areas that have been proclaimed white. During the elections Swartz stood at Kasselsvlei, but was heavily defeated by a Labour Party candidate, and got fewer votes even than the Republican Party candidate who came second. Yet this man is being presented to the world as the so-called 'Prime Minister of Coloured South Africa'.

The Coloured Representative Council is totally subordinate to the central South African Parliament, and its powers are even narrower than those of the Transkei Assembly. The CRC may draft laws on the limited range of matters entrusted to its supervision, but no proposed law may be introduced except with the approval of the Minister of Coloured Affairs. The entire budget of the CRC is voted by the South African Parliament, which can for its part legislate on any matter concerning the Coloured people as it thinks fit.

The president of the (Coloured) Labour Party, Mr M.D. Arendse, was not overstating the position when he told the annual congress of the party in Cape Town in April, 1970, that 'the Nationalist Government had, by devious means, deprived the Coloured people of all democratic voting rights on every level, thus stripping them of the last vestiges of democratic processes. As a result of the new political dispensation that has been engineered by the authorities, we find ourselves now virtually a voiceless people in the land of our birth'.

As far as the Indian community is concerned, the Government has so far not been able to trust itself to hold any form of election. The South African Indian Council Act of 1968 converted the existing South African Indian Council into a statutory body of 25 members, all nominated and dismissible by the Minister of Indian Affairs. The Council, which is appointable for three years, has advisory and consultative sowers on matters affecting the economic, social, cultural, educational and political interests of the Indian people. Though totally a stooge body, the Government has tried to force acceptance of it on the Indian community by compelling all applications for licences, passports etc. to be made through the Council.

WHITE ELECTIONS

The South African general election held on April 22 was called by the Prime Minister, Mr B.J.Vorster, a year before it was due with one main object in view—to crush the right-wing opposition inside the ruling Nationalist Party and restore the monolithic unity of Nationalist Afrikanerdo.

Announcing his decision at the Bloemfontein Congress of the Nationalist Party last September, Mr Vorster said:

'We live in a dangerous world. Because we cannot afford to let the world get the idea that South Africa has an unstable Government, the Cabinet decided that there must be a demonstration of the power of the Nationalist Party as never before in South Africa. The way to do this is to go to the electorate'.

The verkrampte element in the Nationalist Party was expelled and duly formed a new party in October, calling itself the Reconstituted Nationalist Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party) under the leadership of four former Nationalist MPs—Dr Albert Hertzog, Mr Jaap Marais, Mr Willie Marais and Mr Louis Stofberg.

Its platform was Calvinist fundamentalism and naked racialism. It stood for the supremacy of the Afrikaans language over English, the domination of White over Black. It opposed the Government's immigration policy because the majority of immigrants became absorbed in the non-Afrikaans section of the White population and too many of them were Catholics. It opposed Vorster's so-called 'outward policy' towards Black Africa and in particular Vorster's minimal concession towards mixed sport—the acceptance of players with Maori blood in the next New Zealand rugby team to tour South Africa.

The very choice of a party name with the initials H.N.P. was intended to remind the volk of the brave days of 1934 when Dr Malan refused to join General Hertzog in fusion with General Smuts, went out into the electoral wilderness, and began the long struggle to win the allegiance of Afrikanerdom which finally came to fruition with the victory of the Herenigde (reunited) Nasionale Party in 1948.

Since 1948 the Nationalist Party has gone from strength to strength. In 1948 Dr Malan won a bare majority in Parliament though polling 140,000 votes fewer than his opponents. In the last general elections in 1966, in which only the White voters of South Africa and South West Africa were involved, the Nationalist Party won 126 seats, the United Party 39 and the Progressive Party one. The Nationalist Party won 58.6 per cent of the total votes—the highest figure it had ever attained.

Yet at the very apex of its power, the Nationalist Party was being undermined by the conflict between the verligtes (enlightened or liberal elements) and the verkramptes (twisted up or conservative elements). Basically this conflict is based on class divisions which have manifested themselves in the ranks of the Afrikaner people in the last generation (as analysed in "When Thieves Fall Out" in issue No.40 of *The African Communist*).

The election has given Vorster his victory over the HNP—and also shown how the Afrikaner people are in a different position today from 1936. Not a single HNP candidate was returned, and of the 78 HNP candidates who were in the field, 75 forfeited their deposits, including Dr Hertzog himself.

Vorster has clearly demonstrated that the Nationalist Party still enjoy the allegiance of the majority of the Afrikaner people. Only 53,763 votes were cast for HNP candidates, as compared with 820,968 votes for Nationalist Party candidates.

But while crushing the menace from his right wing, Vorster apeared to lose ground to his left. The United Party won back eight marginal seats from the Nationalist Party and increased its majorities in 22 of the seats it held before the election.

Further to the left, the Progressive Party gained votes from the United Party. The lone Progressive Party M.P. Mrs Helen Suzman increased her majority in Houghton, and Progressive Party candidates were narrowly beaten in Sea Point (by 231 votes) and Parktown (by 1,116 votes). In six of the straight U.P.-P.P. clashes the U.P. majorities were cut. With 19 candidates in the field, the Progressive Party gained 51,760 votes in this election, compared with the 41,065 votes gained by their 27 candidates in the 1966 election.

These gains were hailed by many anti-Nationalists as a 'shift to the left' and a 'big jolt' to Vorster and apartheid. *Rand Daily Mail* foreign editor Allister Sparks in an ecstatic appraisal said: 'Here is the evidence of South Africa's awakening to the new challenges before it'.

Before joining in the rejoicing, the results need to be analysed a little more closely. Adding to the Nationalist Parties' votes together—after all theirs is merely a family quarrel—the result is 57.99 of the total poll—only a few points below the 58.62 the Nationalist Party alone gained in 1966.

The United Party's share of the total vote has gone up only fractionally—from 37.05 in 1966 to 37.23 this time.

And the Progressive Party's percentage has risen only from 3.10 in 1966 to 3.43 today.

The share of all the remaining candidates, mostly right-wing break-away Nationalists and the English-led National Alliance Party which also backs apartheid, was only 0.725 of the total poll, compared with 1.23 in 1966.

It is true it is difficult to make an exact comparison. In 1966 there were 19 unopposed candidates, this time 11 (six UP and 5 Nationalists). In addition, one seat, Langlaagte, generally regarded as a safe Nationalist seat, was not contested, because the Nationalist candidate died after nomination day. So a poll was held only in 154 constituencies.

The result was: Nationalist Party 117 (probably to become 118 after the Langlaagte by-election), United Party 47, Progressive Party 1.

But perhaps the greatest difference between 1966 and 1970 was in the percentage of the total electorate that went to the polls. In 1966 the total percentage poll was approximately 83; in 1970 it was only 74.35. One of the seats gained by the United Party from the Nationalists was won with only 58.1 per cent of the voters going to the polls.

There has never been any satisfactory evidence that large numbers of English-speaking voters supported the Nationalist Party, and the claim that the Nationalist Party lost its English-speaking supporters in this election must remain suspect in the absence of proof.

A far more likely explanation for such shift as has been registered is that large numbers of Afrikaners, gravely troubled by the split between N.P. and H.N.P. and unable to resolve the doubts in their own minds, simply abstained from voting. In 1966 the swing to the Nationalists was a whopping 17 per cent. This time (again if one takes the NP and HNP vote together), Nationalist Afrikanerdom marked time. Had there still been only one Nationalist Party in the field, there is little doubt that it would have forged still further ahead.

Bearing these silent voters in mind, Dr Hertzog and his colleagues have announced their intention to continue their campaign, and express confidence in the future. There are provincial elections still to come, either later this year or early next year. Perhaps one will have to wait until then to see if the verkrampte threat has been eliminated.

So long as pressure from the verkramptes continues (and it must be remembered that there are as many remaining inside the Nationalist Party as outside its ranks), the effect can only be to pull the whole Nationalist movement to the right. Not surprisingly, in his first post-election broadcast, Prime Minister Vorster restated his total adherence to apartheid and separate development, and warned against the futility of making any gestures towards meeting the demands of the outside world. He did not even mention the necessity of concessions towards the oppressed millions of the South African people themselves.

But is the United Party any better? It speaks of 'White leadership' instead of White Supremacy, as though there were any essential difference. Mr Michael Mitchell, who did not even have to woo an electorate as he was returned unopposed as M.P. for Durban North, even used the language of Dr Koornhof when on April 20, 1970, he said 'a United Party Government would maintain White leadership in South Africa by force if necessary'.

Similarly the Progressive Party leader, Dr Steytler, who claims his party is the only true alternative to apartheid in South Africa, made it clear in a major policy statement on March 10,1970: 'Certain politicians had tried to create an impression that the Progressive Party stood for one man one vote. This was most definitely not the case'.

In fact, of all the 407 candidates who contested the South African general election, not one stood on a platform of universal suffrage for all, irrespective of race, creed or colour.

Perhaps one should end this survey of the South African electoral scene with the words of a statement issued by the external mission of the African National Congress in London on April 24, noting with surprise reports claiming that the South African elections showed a 'swing to the Left'.

The statement said: 'The elections were fought only on the question of how best the non-white peoples could be exploited....The vile policy of apartheid which is the Nationalist Party's main platform is also that of the United Party....The pill in so far as the non-white peoples are concerned will be as bitter to swallow as apartheid. The economic interests which finance and back the United Party have the same interest as that which supports the Nationalist Party.

'Both these capitalist groups are inter-linked in various ways and are unanimous in their desire to maintain the free flow of cheap black labour.

'Since the election was fought only on the question of how best to exploit the non-white people we in the African National Congress place no importance on its outcome, except to warn the British people not to be hoodwinked into thinking that white South Africa is really swinging Left and that the lot of the black population will improve.

'Our struggle for the free and non-racial democratic South Africa will therefore go on relentlessly'.

In other words, there can be no solution to the problems of South Africa through the ballot box. Not until the bastions of White supremacy are destroyed by the South African revolution will it be possible for the South African masses to exercise the democratic rights which are their due.


AFRICA
MOROCCO 1956
TUNISIA 1956
ALGERIA 1962
LIBYA 1951
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 1922
SPANISH SAHARA
MAURITANIA 1960
MALI 1960
NIGER 1960
CHAD 1960
SUDAN 1956
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1965
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
PORT. GUINEA
GUINEA 1958
SIERRA LEONE
1961
LIBERIA 1847
IVORY COAST 1960
UPPER VOLTA 1960
GHANA
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CAMEROUN 1960
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 1960
AFAR-ISSA TERRITORY
ETHIOPIA Since Biblical times
SOMALIA 1960
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
1968
GABON 1960
CONGO REP. 1960
CONGO 1960
UGANDA 1962
KENYA 1963
RWANDA 1962
BURUNDI 1962
TANZANIA 1961
CABINDA
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA 1964
MALAWI 1964
SOUTH WEST AFRICA
RHODESIA
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAGASY REP. 1960
BOTSWANA 1966
SWAZILAND 1968
LESOTHO 1966
SOUTH AFRICA

Notes and Comments

by Nxele

THE BOTSWANA-ZAMBIA ROAD

There are far-reaching implications in the project to build a highway between Botswana and Zambia, spanning the Chobe River (a tributary of the Zambesi) which demarks the narrow frontier between the two countries.

The South African fascist government has objected to this project in an official note to President Seretse Khama. Pretoria claims that there is no frontier between Botswana and Zambia. *(Rand Daily Mail,* May 13). It claims that the crossing is in the 'Caprivi Strip' of Namibia. In fact the 'legal' case is based on the flimsiest of grounds—not least because the Republic's annexation of Namibia is itself illegal and in defiance of the United Nations. The real reason for the objection is not the narrow strip of river frontage at Kazangula; it is that the opening of the northern highway will help Botswana to escape from the economic grip and political blackmail of the Republic.

The position was well put by President Seretse Khama in his notable address to the 24th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. He said:

> May I remind you of our geographical position and our historical circumstances. Botswana is almost entirely encircled by minority-ruled territories. We have a long and indefensible border with Rhodesia, and a long border with Nambia and South Africa itself. The only railway running between Rhodesia and South Africa passes through Botswana. Not only is this railway operated by Rhodesia Railways but it is vital to both Rhodesian and South African interests. It is also vital to Botswana because it provides our only outlet to the sea and to export markets overseas...Unlike some other states in Southern and Central Africa we have no practical alternative outlet...

In view of this state of affairs one would expect any patriotic and forward-looking government in Botswana, as an absolute priority, to develop a 'practical alternative outlet' This in fact is what the Botswana Government has set itself out to do.



What of course is impermissible is South Africa's belligerent reaction to the agreement between Botswana and Zambia to build a highway linking the two countries. Such a route would mean that Botswana would have an alternative route to the outside world by way of Zambia and Tanzania, and would liberate her from the present position of total dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa for her import-export activities. But at the moment when it became clear that the highway scheme was moving out of the drawing boards into practical implementation, as a result of Botswana successfully negotiating a six million dollar loan for the project, South Africa sent up its balloon.

All long there has been some sort of bush tract which gave Botswana access to the river at the small northern village of Kazangula. A ferry service operates at this point linking the country to Zambia. For some time now, this road has provided rough and hectic travelling for dozens of political refugees from the racist fascist regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique on their way to East Africa and the outside world. Also some small scale trading, mainly in cattle, between Zambia and Botswana has been carried out through this route.

The most blatant and revealing attack on this scheme has come from the external service of Radio South Africa. In a broadcast on April 13th the radio rejected Botswana's claim that it had a 50-yard border with Zambia. It said that the South African interpretation was that South African, Zambian, Rhodesian and Botswana territory all met at one point 'formerly known as 'Crooks' Corner' because of the ease with which criminals could step from one country to another. The radio went on to say:

'Today criminals of another type are slipping across the boundaries into the hot tropical and swampy Caprivi; terrorists sent by Zambia to stir up unrest and trouble in South-West Africa. Possibly Zambi hopes that the construction of a highway will facilitate the task of the terrorists she despatches on missions to South West Africa'.

The Significance of Botswana.

Seretse Khama told the U.N. General Assembly:

> We are for historical reasons part of a customs area dominated by the industrial might of South Africa. We share the monetary system of the Republic of South Africa. Our trade and transport systems are inextricably inter-locked with those of South Africa. So meagre are our employment prospects that we have for many years been obliged to permit some of our young men to go and work in the mines of South Africa. In the immediate foreseeable future we can find no way of providing alternative employment for all these men, nor can we dispense with their earnings...

These 'historical reasons' need some elaboration. Botswana is a vast country with a territory considerably bigger than France, but it is mostly desert. The country was made a British Protectorate in 1885 for purely strategic reasons.

Cecil Rhodes, the chief representative of British imperialism in Southern Africa, saw Botswana as 'the Suez Canal to the North'. He was the dreamer of a dream to set up a South-North bloc of British possessions stretching from the

Cape to Cairo He also wanted to outflank the Boers who had entrenched themselves in the Transvaal and were treatening to block the Northern route. British Colonialism had no interest in advancing Botswana and shamefully neglected the development of the country. As president Seretse Khama pointed out:

> When my government took office in 1965 we were faced with a problem of under-development of classic proportions. Such development programmes as were initiated under colonialism no more than scratched the surface of our problems. Most important of all, in contrast to other British colonies, there had been practically no attempt to train Botswana to run their own country. Not a single secondary school was completed by the colonial government during the whole seventy years of British rule...The roads, water supplies, power supplies on which industrial development is based were totally inadequate. We were in the humiliating position of not knowing many of the basic facts about Botswana on which development plans could be based...

Actually, the basic economic facts about Botswana are gloomier than a President can be expected to spell out.

Botswana's Economy

In an area of 225,000 square miles, most of the 350,000 people subsist on ranching some 1½ million poor-grade cattle. There is a chronic shortage of water. Only five per cent of the arable land is under cultivation. Botswana cannot balance its budget and is heavily dependent on financial aid from Britain and on cooperation from South Africa. Little wonder therefore that thousands of Botswana citizens seek employment in South Africa where they work under the humiliating conditions of apartheid.

There was little industrial activity in the country to talk about. Cattle are a symbol of wealth for the Botswana people but the sale of beef became meaningful only in 1954 when an abattoir was erected in Lobatsi by the colonial Development Corporation. Until this abattoir was started all cattle from Botswana had to be exported on the hoof, involving treks through parched scrub country with consequent deterioration. Activity in the livestock sector accounts for 96 per cent of the country's exports.

Botswana's agricultural products were restricted mainly to maize and sorgum. And in a country where maize is the staple food, it had most of the time to be imported. In 1955, which was a good year for rainfall, Botswana imported nearly 14,000 bags of maize and maize meal.

Because of near-desert conditions in the country, water, or rather the lack of it, is the main headache of Botswana. In the centre of the country's coat-of-arms appears a profile of the head of an ox. Below it appears the one word: *PULA*—rain.

Droughts occur often. The most recent which lasted for five years and was interrupted temporarily by the 1966-67 rainy season was disastrous. It reduced the cattle population by one third, and forced the government to mount a massive food-for-work programme aided by the World Food Programme.

Roads and communications in general were scandalously neglected by colonialism. A Food and Agricultural Mission which investigated the stock industry a few years ago concluded that 'An integrated road system is an urgent need, a first prerequisite for real expansion and development...'

Botswana and South Africa

The heavy dependence of Botswana on South Africa is reflected in numerous spheres, among the most important being the revenue from customs and the employment South Africa gives to Botswana citizens. Like the other two former British Territories of Lesotho and Swaziland, both in the colonial period and now, Botswana does not impose her own customs duties on imports but obtains a fixed share of South Africa's customs revenue. And as the British built no industries or other employment openings many of the Botswana menfolk have to seek jobs in South Africa. During 1962 for instance 25,315 workers left Botswana to sell their labour power in South Africa. As far as beef exports go, in 1959 which was a peak year, South Africa absorbed 56,000 in carcasses and on the hoof, out of a total export of 97,000.

Armed with these powerful trump cards, South Africa has long sought to impose her political domination over Botswana. At times this took the form of demands for the incorporation of the three Territories of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho into South Africa. At other times South Africa resorted to intimidation and even illegal and provocative actions in these territories.

For example in 1963, a political refugee from South West Africa, Dr. Kenneth Abrahams, was kidnapped from Botswana by agents of the South African police and released only after tremendous international pressure. Then in the same period South African agents blew up an East African Airways charter plane which was due to fly out South African political refugees from the terrorittory.

Vis-a-vis post independence Botswana, South Africa has adopted the now familiar strategy—loudly proclaiming 'good-neighbourly' intentions, offers of diplomatic links, on the one hand and on the other hand secretly carrying on subversive activities. But South Africa's false gospel is transparent through and through. Whilst she waives the colour-bar in respect of top Government officials from the neighbouring Black African states, thousands of Africans from these territories who work in South Africa are subjected to the same racist humiliation and economic exploitation as the indigenous Africans. And the comings and goings of South African secret police into countries like Botswana are also well known.

South Africa's strategy is based on the assumption that the African countries of Southern Africa are so economically dependent on the Republic that for the sake of getting 'daily bread' they would sacrifice their principles. Should these states refuse to toe the line and strive for economic independence then South Africa's rulers are quite ready to move into the second phase of her strategy—namely, to cast away the niceties and resort to intimidation and open aggression.

Botswana and the Alternatives

In Botswana, new developments are looming which South Africa is already viewing with alarm, like a motorist who suddenly sees the green lights turn amber. Yes, the lights are changing from 'go-ahead' to 'caution' in Botswana. Why? One reason is that Botswana herself is discovering unexpected resources

Writing in the magazine *New Commonwealth* (number 4, 1968), Botswana's Vice-President, Mr. O.K.J.Masire, stated that recent developments in Botswana

> considerably broaden the potential for economic development. Substantial deposits of copper, nickel, diamonds and coal, have been discovered. In the case of copper, nickel and coal sufficient ores have already been proved, and investigations of economic feadibility are far enough advanced to indicate that major mining developments will occur in Botswana during the next five years.

This new development is highly unwelcome to the political and economic rulers across the border. It appears that some of South Africa's trump cards are going fast. Nor are they at all pleased about the establishment of diplomatic links between Botswana and the Soviet Union on which the Johannesburg newspaper *The Star* (18/4/70) commented: 'Predictably, this...starts alarm bells ringing in Pretoria and fills the South African Government with dread'.

Such is the background to Pretoria's outburst on the proposed highway to Zambia.

Botswana's Reaction

However, the situation is moving fast. During the second week of April Botswana's President Seretse Khama and Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda held emergency talks which lasted for two days in the southern Zambia border town of Sesheke at the end of which they reiterated their resolve to proceed with the highway.

On April 14th, the Botswana Government issued the following statement:

> The Government has received a note from South Africa which expresses the South African view that Botswana has no common frontier with Zambia. The Botswana Government sees no reason to change its existing view that Botswana and Zambia have a common, though undefined boundary at Kazangula. As far as the proposed Nata/Kazangula Road is concerned the Botswana Government takes the view that this in no way alters the status quo since it simply improves access to the Kazungula Ferry which has been operating unchallenged for many years. Not only will the road open up possibilities of trade with Zambia, but will make possible the development of a hitherto inaccessible region of Botswana.

But the matter does not end there. When we come to the problem of definition of boundaries in this area, we have to bear in mind the main fact that South Africa has no territorial rights in the boundary area at all. Her claims of authority over Namibia (South West Africa) are invalid.

Therefore, should Pretoria be so ill-advised as to try to bring this matter before the International Court she is bound to be met with the very same argument which was used by her to defeat the demands of Liberia and Ethiopia that she quit Namibia—that they had no direct interest in the matter. This would once again call into question the Republic's illegal annexation of the former mandated territory.

But this is far wider and more important than a legal or territorial argument. Whatever form it takes, any stand by the Botswana government at Gaberones against the bullying Goliath across the border is a front-line stand for Africa and for human rights which merits—and needs—warm support from all who value human rights.

CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE FINDS ITS PATH

The removal of Governments by military coups in post-independence Africa, is something which has made everybody sick. More especially since this kind of nonsense has been clearly seen as a tactic of noe-colonialism seeking to entrench itself in Africa by unleashing ambitious and self-seeking military men, whom it previously groomed in its military academies of Sandhurst, France and Brussels. Of course, as we all know there are exceptions to every rule. The Nasserite Coup in Egypt spelt the death knell to feudalism and brought about revolutionary gains.

Similarly, no one shed tears when the arch-reactionary and French puppet, former Congolese (Brazzaville) Abbe Fulbert Youlou was forcibly deposed on August 15th 1963. In fact, that particular action was more in the nature of a popular armed uprising, which was spearheaded by the workers. Led by their trade unions, the workers staged 'three glorious days' of demonstrations and strikes against the Youlou neo-colonialist regime. True, the decision of the military to side with them was decisive. The army, however, left power in the hands of civilian leaders. Thus Alphonso Massemba-Debbat became president.

In African and international affairs the new Congolese Government adopted a progressive stance. By way of consolidating the internal popular base, a people's militia was created and trained by the Cubans.

However, five years after assuming power on September 4th, 1968, Massembat-Debbat was ousted as president, in a military coup. He was succeeded by Captain Alfred Raoul. Three months later, in December 1968, Captain Raoul was replaced as president by another army man, Captain Marien Ngoaubi.

In November 1969, a coup against Ngoaubi was attempted but was foiled. Then at the end of March this year a group of armed men headed by former Congolese Lieutenant Pierre Kikange, invaded the territory from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) and seized the Brazzaville radio station in yet another attempted coup. But Ngoaubi acted resolutely, had the armed clique surrounded and crushed. Their leader Kikanga was killed in the fighting outside the radio station. Among those who were captured and subsequently executed three were former officers of the army of the People's Republic of the Congo. A former Minister of Defence Captain Augustin Poignet who was named as another leading figure behind the coup was also executed.

A Government statement on this abortive March 23rd coup stated that: 'the plotters had been trained by the military regime of the Congo (Kinshasa) and financially aided by the U.S. embassy in that country'.

The suppression of this coup has come as a relief to all progressives inside and outside the Congo (Brazzaville). There are reasons for this.

On December 31, 1969, almost ten years since the country gained independence, the Congo (Brazzaville) declared itself a People's Republic. A Council of State along the lines of the other People's Democracies was formed. And it was declared that 'The party must direct the state'.

This vanguard party is the Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT Congolese Worker's Party), and accepts Marxism-Leninism as its ideology. The 'Internationale' is played alongside the Congolese national anthem and the red flag flutters proudly along the banks of the Congo River.

The *Le Monde* correspondent Gilbert Comte (weekly edition April 1, 1970) describing the current situation says inter alia: 'The European community sees the threat of plunder when President Marien Ngouabi thunders at a meeting against the 'enemies of the people' and 'imperialism that controls all the private enterprises in the country".' However

Comte goes on to say:

> Despite President Ngouabi's fiery oratory, his style of government is more ,umane than the extremism of the ideology he professes would seem to indicate. On a continent where individual liberty counts for little, imprisonment is rarely used as a political weapon by the Congolese leader and is never imposed without sufficient evidence'

Such are the standard barometers used by European commentators in Africa. They concern themselves with the fears and hopes of the White man and see the problems of human values through their own bourgeois perspectives. But what have the Congolese leaders themselves to say about their own situation? Comte quotes President Ngouabi as follows: 'The Congo has chosen its path. Marxism-Leninism is its guiding principle because use planning is the best formula for progress in an underdeveloped country. We do not wish to institute 'tolalitarian egalitarianism' but simply want to end man's exploitation of man. This choice should surprise no one. We made it in 1963'. The Congolese leader added 'Every country has the right to choose its own path, and ours is through scientific socialism. It scandalizes the Western Nations, particularly the Common Market members. But we have no desire to harm anybody'.

Background

The small equitorial African Congolese State, whose population numbers about one million, became independent on May 15th 1960. But under the Presidency of Fulbert Youlou it became a hotbed of imperialist conspiracies against the progressive African states, more especially against the Lumumba Government in neighbouring Congo (Kinshasa). The motorious Kasavubu broadcast which purported to sack Lumumba from premiership was made from Brazzaville. Youlou became a big buddy of the Congolese traitor Moise Tshombe. Then came the August 1963 revolution. Although the new President Massemba-Debbat brought about progressive changes he clearly had no revolutionary intentions. His concessions were in the nature of appeasements to the militants to avoid an open confrontation.

But Massemba-Debbat began to pursue more reactionary policies. He drew the Congo closer to the OCAM which comprises a group of French-speaking African States pursuing right wing policies, and in close association with the Common Market.

After five years in office Massemba-Debbat dissolved the National Assembly and the Political Bureau and assumed personal control of the country. He imprisoned Marien Ngouabi who was a top officer heading the paratroopers. But the paratroopers mutinied and after several convulsive months the government crumbled. Ngoaubi was released and became chairman of the National Revolutionary Council. One of his first acts in power was to throw open the prison gates to release scores of leftwing politicians jailed by Massemba-Debbat.

As far back as 1963 the Congolese Marxists had planned that by the end of 1969, a workers party, the Parti Congolais du Travail should be founded and a Peoples Republic established.

A correspondent of the G.D.R. magazine *Horizont* (4/3/70) asked President Ngouabi what problems had appeared during the period of building their socialist state. President Ngouabi answered that it was naturally difficult to say anything about this after only a few weeks of the establishment of their state. But he emphasised the enormous response, the inspiration, that the appeal for the founding of the party had evoked in the regions, districts and mass organisations.

'The founding of the Party mobilised the masses. It is something like an awakening from earlier false positions. One can see the way into the future clearly now'

Ngouabi said that they had already made good advances in the mobilisation of the masses in the towns. Regarding the countryside, he said, the party intends to go to the countryside, hold meetings and conferences and formulate a programme which reflects the interests of the masses and thereby prepares them to take their place in the Revolutionary Committee for Industrial Enterprises. This committee, he pointed out, confirms the leading role of the working class as the necessary step for the stability of the future order.

SUDAN: REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The recent events in the Sudan seem to have aroused a great deal of talk and commentaries in the press. The situation was triggered off by the old semi-feudal elements in the country in an attempt to regain political power.

'The traditional religious sectarianism led by the Imman El Mahdi, and with the backing of certain imperialist powers, staged a senseless armed rebellion against the constituted government. This rebellion is now completely crushed and complete order is now restored'.

This was a statement made by Sayed Joseph Garang, Minister of State for Souuthern Affairs of the Sudan, at press conference in London during the second week of April.

Now listen to what the right wing magazine *African Development* had to say about these events. Its editorial in the issue of April-May 1970 says: 'During the last month Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville have narrowly averted military coups. They were lucky..'

But the actual situation has nothing to with luck! Sayed Garang at the press conference went on to say:

> The Revolutionary Government for months had purposely avoided any confrontation with the religious sects. But they, instead provoked the government by taking measures you have just heard. The recent incidents have proved also that the bulk of the Ansars support the Revolution against the forces of reaction and exploitation. Thousands of so-called traditional followers of the Mahdi have rallied to the Government.

When the new Sudanese leaders explain the programme of the 25th May Revolution, you see immediately that the 'luck theory' has no room, and you understand why the masses are rallying behind the government.

The main theme of the Revolutionary Government policy can be broadly summed up as follows:

1. The aim is to regenerate the economic life of the country. This is being carried out by introducing a nation-wide agrarian reform. This land reform involves diversification and modernisation of agriculture. Says Sayed Joe Garang: 'In other words we want to move out from primitive to scientific methods of agriculture'.

The agriculture production, it is planned, will raise economic activity and consequently the living standards of the masses.

2. The Revolutionary Government plans to liberate the economy from foreign firms which now hold a tight grip on the economic life of the country. At present these foreign firms control banking, insurance, import and export trade. The worst aspect of course is the practice, notorious all over the world, of exporting large profits outside the Sudan.

The Sudanese leaders believe that political independence is conditional on economic independence.

3. One of the main objectives of the May Revolution was to put an end to the fratricidal civil war against the Southern Sudanese. The Revolutionary Government has rejected the principle of force and wants to solve the 'Southern Problem' by peaceful means.

To understand the full significance of this minimum programme, one has to take into account the evolution of the political situation in the Sudan in recent years, beginning with the events of October 1964 when a combination of progressive elements in the Sudan forced the Abboud military dictatorship out of office. This October Revolution however did not last long. To use the words of Sayed Garang, 'it was usurped and finally overthrown in February 1965 by the combined force of the reactionary traditional political parties'.

A statement of the Ministry of National Guidance of the present Revolutionary Government says:

> The set-backs to the people's Revolution of October 1964 led to the deterioration of the nation's conditions—and total disorder, corruption and dissolution set themselves in the country. The noble aspirations of our people which were to find expression in that great Revolution were be-

political affairs

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> trayed and trampled underground. People were led to a state of complete disillusionment and tragic despair and apathy.

At the London press conference a correspondent of the *Financial Times* put it to Sayed Garang that the policy of altering the system of land tenure predates the present revolution.

To this Garang answered. 'In a way it predates the revolution. But until now nothing real was done to alter land tenure. The failure of previous governments reflected differences of interest. The Umma party was interested in maintaining the old system for economic reasons. The other party in the coalition at that time—the National Democratic party—was not. So the issue became a matter of political manoeuvre and nothing was effected'.

Regarding current Government land policy in the North, he added

'In areas where there were large private schemes—mainly cotton schemes—the policy of the government is that any private scheme whose licence expires shall not get a renewal. As you know, all land in the Sudan is stateowned, and the state may lease it out under licence for a specific period. Thus the policy now is that all private schemes whose licences expire shall be turned over to the government. This will be distributed among the peasants in the form of co-operative societies'.

On the economic front in general the policy was outlined by Sayed Babiker Awadalla then Prime Minister and now the Vice-President of the Republic. In a speech on 25 May 1969 he said:

'The Revolution is well aware of the fact that independence is meaningless if it is not based on a strong independent economic system. It also knows that the financial and economic crises we lived in were an outcome of the strong link between the reactionary forces and foreign imperialist development' He then outlined Government economic policy as follows:

1. Broadening the basis of the public sector, particularly in the industrial field to replace foreign investment, taking over the import and export monopoly of the essential commodities and forming a marketing committee for the basis of the sublic sector, particularly in the industrial field to replace foreign investment, taking over the import and export monopoly of the essential commodities and forming a marketing committee for the basic exports.

2. Encouragement of national capital that is not connected with imperialism and its protection to compete with foreign capital under supervision of the public sector.

3. Changing monetary policy regarding foreign loans, which should not be resorted to if there is no urgent need in the development field. These loans should be for long terms, at low rates of interest and without conditions.

The problem of Southern Sudan and efforts to solve it occupy an important place in the plans of the Sudanese Revolutionary Government. The reasons for this are not far to seek. In order to halt or slow down the pace of progress in the Sudan, imperialism as a matter of strategy, created and stirs up the so-called Southern Sudan Problem.

Firstly, British imperialism sought to frustrate demands for independence of the Sudan by arousing fears among the Negroid Southern Sudanese that they would be dominated by the Arabs. But, as Sayed Joe Garang said, 'The Southern problem is not one of racial struggle or persecution of Africans by Arabs. Such superficial explanations do not in fact explain anything. Arab tribes began migrating to the Sudan about 600 years ago from North Africa, Egypt and Arabia. They mixed freely and intermarried freely with the negroid tribes they found'.

Following the fall of the Abboud regime a broad-based civilian government was formed in October 1964. The October Government declared that the Southern problem was a political one and therefore required a peaceful political solution. The Government immediately initiated direct contacts with Southern Sudanese political exiles for a conference with representatives of the political parties in the North. A Round Table Conference did actually take place in March 1965. The conference failed because the traditional political parties both in the North and the South were not serious about a practical solution. 'In July 1965, the traditionalists launched a policy of suppressing the rebellion in the South by force. This resulted in the killing of innocent citizens in most Southern towns. As a result of this policy, thousands of Southerners were forced to seek refuge in the bush or in neighbouring countries'.

Regional autonomy

On June 9th, 1969, the Revolutionary Government announced a programme acceptable to both North and South for the solution of the Southern problem. The essence of this programme was that the Southern provinces shall have regional autonomy within a united Sudan. The Revolutionary Government from the start recognised the differences which existed between the North and South. These differences are historical, cultural, ethnical, linguistic and geographical. Sayed Garang stressed that 'The cause of the Southern problem is the inequality which exists between the North and South by reason of an uneven economic, social and cultural development'. The June declaration of regional autonomy for the Southern provinces has received nation-wide support. The programme for regional autonomy stipulates an action plan for social, economic and cultural development of the South. Under the 1969/1970 budget of the Sudan, a sum of 2.67 million Sudanese pounds has been set aside for a crash programme.

Fresh mischief

Recently, there have been fresh attempts to rekindle the civil strife in the Southern Sudan. Some armed rebels belonging to an organisation called the Anya-nya have carried out ambushes against the police and have blown up some bridges. A new development is the support which Israel is giving to these rebel bands. Israel instructors are reported to be training there from bases set up in some neighbouring African states. Some sections of the Christian church are also supporting the rebels. To these rebels, Sudanese leaders have said: 'We will construct. You destroy. We will build schools, you burn them. We will build hospitals, you destroy them. We will build roads, you burn and break bridges. It shall be the people of the South to decide for themselves who is building and who is destroying'. As a result of strife and uncertainty many towns and villages were deserted.

But there are already hopeful signs that the people are returning. Describing the situation in some of the towns in the South, Joe Garang says that in July 1969, he visited the small border town of Yei, and found that there were only 112 people, apart from the army and the police contingent. He visited the same town a month later in August. This time he found that the number had shot up to 4,000. In January this year he was again there and the population had become 25,000.

The people are voting with their feet.

BOOK REVIEWS

NAILING THE BIG LIE

The Oxford History of South Africa. Vol 1: South Africa to 1870. Edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson. Oxford University Press, 75s.

African Societies in Southern Africa. Edited by Leonard Thompson. Heinemann, 30s.

Hill of Destiny. by Peter Becker. Longman, 50s.

> *'The white ruling classes ... have manufactured a version of the past and present of this country which they systematically attempt to impose everywhere ... According to this picture the early white settlers penetrated peacefully into a virtually unoccupied country. The African population, who are depicted as savage barbarians without culture, achievements or history, are represented as relative newcomers... This version of South Africa's past is entirely false.'*
>
> The Road to South African Freedom.

This damning indictment of the Big Lie which has hiterto formed the basis of all official South African history-writing, whether from the British imperialist or the Afrikaner nationalist school, was advanced in the 1962 Programme of the Communist Party.

It now receives powerful confirmation in the new Oxford History of South Africa, edited by Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson, a most notable work which is destined to relegate to the academic junk-heap pratically all they myth-making which has hiterto passed as 'South African History' and opens up an entire new epoch in our historiography.

In their Preface to the first volume (the second has not, at the time of writing made its appearance) Professors Wilson and Thompson make the basic point: 'In a rigidly stratified society historical writing .. is not merely a *reflection* of social inequality; it is also a powerful instrument for the *maintenance* of inequality.'

They continue to list five 'misleading assumptions' of previous South African history books: 1—that our history began with the 'discovery' of the Cape by the Portuguese; 2—that the Africans had no history: i.e. their societies were static; 3—'that physical type language and economy are *necessarily* correlated; 4—that each of the four 'physical types' San, Khoikhoi, European and African, formed a 'pure race'; and 5—that historians should be concerned only with social structure (i.e. 'white' societies), anthropologists only with 'black' tribal societies. In other words both groups of researchers should combine to study the whole field of human relations.

Professor Thompson returns to the theme in his introductory chapter 'The forgotten factor in southern African history' to *African Societies in Southern Africa*, collection of thirteen of the papers presented at the conference on that theme held at Lusaka in July 1968 to co-ordinate the researches of historians, archaeologists and social anthropologists in this field.

Pointing out that 'the study and writing of southern African history have reflected the social structure of the area, he writes

> Historians have been mainly concerned with the activities of the white community, which did not gain a permanent foothold at the Cape until the second half of the seventeenth century. They have tended to ignore, or to treat very summarily, the history of the African peoples before they were subjected to white over-rule.

That this tendency is still very much alive in South Africa today is evidenced by the most recent Afrikaans history, C.F.J.Muller's *Vyfhonderd Jaar Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis* which 'starts with the Portuguese voyages round the Cape of Good Hope and relegates the history of the African peoples to an appendix, pp. 435-55.'

This cursory attitude towards the past of the African peoples does not only reflect the arrogant and contemptuous attitude of White South African towards the indigenous peoples—the attitude that they have no history and that it is not worth bothering about anyway. It is a deliberate attempt, dating from the days of Theal, the archivist-historian-propagandist of the old Cape Colony, to whitewash the white intruders and to cover up the great central fact of our country's story: the forcible dispossession of the Africans from their ancestral lands, and their proletarianisation by the whites.

The great merit of the 'new school' of South African history represented by the Oxford History and the Lusaka papers, is that they assert that the African peoples do have a history, that it is capable of being studied and is of central importance in the understanding of our country's past. So doing they have dealt a deathblow to the myth upon which so much of White South Africa's ideological justifications and assurance have been built. They are making a *beginning* towards the reconstruction of the true story of South Africa's past.

But -and this must be emphasised—it is *only* a beginning. Both the Oxford History and the Lusaka papers contain a great deal of fascinating and stimulating detail; the writers are refreshingly novel in their approach. But in fact they contain very little that is really new. It is very clear that a tremendous amount of fresh research remains to be done. Leonard Thompson himself indicates this in his introduction to the Lusaka collection. 'The lacunas in southern African historical knowledge cannot be attributed to a dearth of data...there is an enormous quantity of relevant source-material waiting to be exlpored.' After directing attention to material and archives in Europe, American and South Africa itself, he adds '... much intensive field-work is still to be done inside Southern Africa to uncover various types of latent information' (archaeological, linguistic, etc.) '.. rich veins of tradition remain to be tapped.' In the face of such disarming modesty, it is hard to be very critical. Nevertheless, with all its merits the new history needs to be approached in a critical spirit. In particular the unsavoury role of British imperialism has not been adequately expounded. But I would welcome an opportunity to return to this theme when the second volume of the Oxford History appears later this year.

As a result of the complete dearth of academic studies of African history in our country, a number of 'popular' biographies of African rulers have appeared in recent years, such as E.A. Ritter's *Shaka Zulu*. Despite the genuine research which went into their preparation, these tend (once more to cite the extremely-quotable Thompson) 'to be somewhat romantic works, mixing fact with fiction and lacking the technical apparatus of scholarly writing.'

The latest in this series is Peter Becker's *Hill of Destiny* (the reference is to Thaba Bosiu) a biography of Moshoeshoe the Great, founder of the Basotho nation.

This is a disappointing book. Dr Becker does relate many of the salient incidents in the life of Moshoeshoe, and no such account can fail to arouse profound admiration for one of the greatest South Africans of his time. But in his attempt to whitewash the British and Boer intruders, who between them dispossessed the Basotho of vast areas of their most valuable farmlands west of the Caledon River, and eventually of their independence, he grossly underplays the brilliant diplomacy and strategy of Moshoeshoe, whose astute leadership preserved those vital elements of the nation which have enabled the Lesotho heartland to survive until today.

A. Lerumo

LENINIST WORLD SURVEY

International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969.
Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague. (Available from Inkulueko Publications, 10s. post free to anywhere in Africa.)

A year ago 75 Communist Parties sent their representatives to Moscow for the international conference. In view of the importance of the occasion, most of the Parties sent their leading men to the meeting—such outstanding national and international figures as Leonid Brezhnev of the U.S.S.R., Wladyslav Gomulka of Poland, Walter Ulbricht of the G.D.R., Janos Kadar of Hungary, Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, Carlos Rodriguez of Cuba, Gustav Husak of Czechosolvakia, Waldeck Rochet of France, Gus Hall of the United States, Cheddi Jagan of Guyana and Enrico Berlinguer of Italy.

The delegates came from Europe, North and South America, Asia and Africa. From our continent came representatives from Sudan, Tunis, Morocco, Nigeria, Algeria, Reunion, Lesotho and South Africa.

In addition to dealing with the important international political and theoretical problems facing the meeting, most of the delegates also took the opportunity to acquaint the meeting with the outstanding developments and problems facing the revolutionary movement in their own countries.

To the extent that the speeches cover common problems, of course there is very wide unanimity, as reflected in the main document and others adopted by nearly all the Parties. But unanimity does not mean identity of views and expression. Each Party views the common themes from the viewpoint of its own country's position and experiences, as well as from the general principles of scientific socialism which all share. The result is an extremely wide—ranging spectrum, full of variety and illuminating insights.

In short the record of the meeting is a rich and rewarding anthology of contemporary Marxist-Leninist thought as expounded by its leading upholders in theory and practice throughout the world. It is required reading for Communists and other fighters for liberation. And at the special price offered to readers in Africa by the publishers of this journal, this bulky 780-page clothbound volume is truly remarkable value as well!

T.A.

THE LIBERAL FACE OF US IMPERIALISM

Southern Africa and the United States by William A. Hance (ed.), Leo Kuper, Vernon McKay and Edwin S. Munger (Columbia University Press—1968).

> The United Sates must continue to stand by its long and deeply held principles and ideals supporting human rights and racial equality.

With these resounding words, four leading American scholars, 'experts' on Africa, end their examination of US policies in relation to Southern Africa. The U.S. is against apartheid—the refrain recurs throughout the book. Little Rock, Watts, Chicago—Vietnam, Guatemala, Bolivia—the Middle East, the Congo, Brazil: one wonders what is meant by 'long and deeply held principles...human rights and racial equality.'

Professor Hance and his colleagues have written a subtle and insidious book. Liberal, factual, fair-minded and objective in appearance, their chapters in fact amount to a vicious and dangerous—because deceptive—defence of the status quo in Southern Africa and US imperialism's interests. The main purpose of the exercise is to review US policy options. Support for the liberation struggle is not even considered as a possibility. Hance, in his main contribution, confines himself to examining the case for and against US disengagement from South Africa. Naive readers, who might imagine that 'disengagement' might be something to do with sanctions, are soon disabused. Sanctions are not what Hance has in mind at all. He means something less than sanctions. In fact, he ends up advocating the opposite of sanctions.

> dependence on the US is most significant in trade and in the quantitative and qualitative contribution of American concerns to its manufacturing sector. In view of the relatively favourable record of manufacturing industries in South Africa with respect to wages and new job opportunities for non-whites, the present and growing emphasis of American investment on manufacturing is not entirely to be deprecated. (p.157)

So US profiteers, far from propping up apartheid, are actually undermining it and helping the African worker by investing in South Africa.

Having thus stood disengagement on its head, Hance then indicates how the policy is to implemented. It has now become one of 'moral dissociation or selective disengagement,' and is to be achieved by (1) more verbal repudiation of apartheid, (2) talking to the Vorster regime and persuading it to be a less embarrassing cold war ally, and (3):

> Assisting in opening a dialogue between South Africa and other African states, possibly by encouraging an exchange program to reduce the mutual ignorance of both sides.

Thus can be seen a harmony of interests between US imperialism in Southern Africa and Vorster's outward 'verligte' policy of subverting independent African states in order to undermine the liberation struggle.

If it were still possible to doubt the racist character of the book, the chapter by Edwin Munger would dispel the last shadows. Writing at a time when repression was never worse, after the terror of 90 days and 180 days and the goaling of thousands of opponents of apartheid, Munger has the gall to assert that the African voice is now being heard for the first time in the arena of white politics. He is of course refering to the collaborator element being created by the Bantusatan policy—the Matanzima's and others who sell their birthright for a mess of pottage.

The true voice of the oppressed majority, Munger snidely dismisses. African militance, in his view, has failed, achieving only a greater unity of the whites. The same sick perverted logic leads him to denigrate a great South African Communist whose shoes he is not fit to clean:

> The Communist-led efforts, such as those so fully revealed by the Rivonia farm raid of July 1963, and in the activities of Communist leader Braam Fischer before his capture, pulled the legs from beneath many English-speaking whites who sincerely had defended Fischer and his colleagues as not being Communists but persecuted liberals. Fischer's dramatic affirmation of his long devotion to the Communist cause, and his espousal of violence further undermined non-Communist opposition to unification of the white oligarchy. In the end, efforts to create chaos or fear have been successfully countered by the government, violence has ebbed, fear has declined, and the government has been strengthened in its views that might must be white. (p. 41)

This extraordinary passage repays close study. It illustrates perfectly the subtle mixture of pseudo-objectivity, innuendo; falsehood and slander which one expects from the apologists of US imperialism. The peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia are well used to this double-talk. Now Africa too must be alert to its dangers. When 'peace' means war, 'development' means exploitation, and 'co-operation' means subordination, we are obliged to suspect everything that is said. Imperialism may have a liberal face, but it is still imperialism.

J.V.

communist viewpoint

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BOTSWANA'S FOREIGN POLICY

SERETSE KHAMA

President Seretse Khama opened the ninth annual conference of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party at Molepolole on 28 March, 1970. In view of the important role which geography and history have conferred on the Republic of Botswana, especially in view of the interference of its powerful and aggressive neighbour, fascist South Africa (see Africa: Notes and Comments in this issue of our journal) his words are of especial interests and significance, the more so since he concentrated on external affairs. The President began by greeting and introducing guests from fraternal parties—TANU of Tanzania and UNIP of Zambia. The remainder of his address, translated from the Setswana, was as follows:-

It has been my practice in the past on these occasions to review the whole field of Botswana's development, but today I want to focus on one major theme: Botswana's foreign policy. It is not that I wish today to announce any dramatic new policy departure. Indeed I want to stress that our foreign policy has since Independence developed gradually and always in a consistent direction. I have made references to our foreign policy objectives in Conference speeches and other occasions, but apart from my Address to the United Nations last August, I have not attempted to pull the threads of our policy together and to explain in detail the principles underlying it. And it is this last task today on which I wish to concentrate. In our 1969 Election Manifesto we outlined our national objectives of democracy, development, self-reliance and unity, and showed how we applied them in practice. Foreign policy was dealt with in an introductory chapter which sought to explain the meaning of Independence. Today I want to attempt to apply our national principles specifically to the field of external affairs. I think it is time that as a party we considered in greater depth Botswana's role in Africa and in the world. It is necessary that you the leaders of our party should have a clear grasp of these matters so that you can explain them directly to our people, and relate them to our other policies.

But first let us make it clear that we are free from illusions.

We are well aware that we are still a largely undeveloped, sparsely' populated country, whose first concern must be our own development. We must put the highest priority on our development effort if independence is to have real meaning for our people. We recognise that we are not a world power, to be reckoned with in the highest international circles. No other country trembles when we speak. We have no army. The machinery through which we conduct our diplomatic affairs is fairly rudimentary. Because of financial and manpower limitations we have at present only four foreign missions, and these together with the external affairs section of my own Office, have small staffs.

So we are not unaware of our limitations. But that is not a reason for declining to adopt a consistent approach to world affairs. Our capacity to influence world events may be limited, but that is no reason for not attempting to make a contribution where we can. In order to do this, we must be clear about our principles, and consistent in out attempts to apply them.

We must also recognise that though, like many other countries, in an increasingly interdependent world, our options are limited by circumstance, we are nonetheless an independent sovereign state, and a member of the OAU, the UN and the Commonwealth. Membership of these organisations confers certain advantages and imposes certain responsibilities and obligations. It also makes it possible for us to put our viewpoint before a wider audience than would be possible through our bilateral relationships with other states.

How then do we translate the principles of the BDP and Botswana into concrete foreign policy objectives? To begin with our first and basic principle, how do we interpret our concern with **democracy** in the field of external relations with all friendly states, our closest relationships are with those countries who share our commitment to democracy.

Democratic societies should favour the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means rather than by recourse to violence, and Botswana therefore gives full support to those international institutions which offer the hope that disputes can be settled peacefully. I am thinking in particular of the United Nations, but also of the Commonwealth, and of the Organisation of African Unity, especially its Committee for Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.

We recognise, however, that there is no single framework for democracy, and that different states apply the basic principles of democracy in different ways. But for Botswana a basic ingredient of democracy is that each man's vote has equal value, and that each man must be encouraged to make an equal contribution to his country's well-being and development. Democracy must permit everyone, irrespective of race, colour, tribe or creed to fulfil himself and make the contribution to his society which his education and abilities permit. We hope in particular by demonstrating that non-racial democracies can be successful in Africa, that countries like Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia will lead other societies, which are based on the denial of self-determination on grounds of race, to modify and ultimately to abandon their inhumane and wasteful practices.

While we respect the principles of non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign states, we are as a non-racial democracy bound to raise our voice in international forums in support of the principle of universal self-determination. The same sense of duty and our geographical position means that we must continue to provide a refuge for those who have found themselves unable for one reason or another to continue to live in neighbouring minority-ruled territories. We recognise our responsibility to these victims of political circumstance, and we are trying to discharge this obligation as well as our resources permit. And here we must acknowledge the generous assistance we have received from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the World Council of Churches and other international bodies. We have granted refugees recognition of their status and done all within our power to settle them and assist them in beginning a new life in Botswana. All we ask in return is that refugees should respect our laws and our national principles, and refrain from activities which are prejudicial to our security or which could adversely affect the present climate of tolerance towards them among Batswana.

Finally since democracy is based on the belief that each citizen should be permitted as far as possible to lead his own life, in the international context democracy leads us to insist on the right of sovereign countries to determine their own policies freely and without external interference, providing only that in so doing they do not threaten world peace or the security of other countries.

INTERNATIONAL INEQUALITY

Our second national principle is **development** and this preoccupation leads Botswana to press in international circles for redressing the imbalance of world resources in favour of the poorer countries. The greatest threat to world peace is international inequality. And here I am not just thinking in terms of increasing the flow of aid and investment from rich countries to poor ones. I am concerned that countries which produce, or as in the case of Botswana will produce, essential raw materials get a fair return for them. Commodity prices and world tariff structures must be arranged in ways which permit emerging industrial countries to protect their infant industries while encouraging them to compete in the markets of more developed countries. Botswana supports the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and through its membership of international development and financial agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and at meetings of Commonwealth leaders and at Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Conferences we raise our voice alongside our brothers in the developing world. A change in the price of an export commodity, or the introduction of a tariff change can only too easily cancel out the efforts of workers and farmers struggling to raise their own and their country's standard of living.

These considerations lead me naturally to our next principle, which is **self-reliance.** I believe all African countries are increasingly recognising the importance of this principle. In Botswana our dedication to self-reliance stems from the self-help efforts of the famine seriod, which we called 'Ipelegeng'. In Tanzania the same principle is known as 'Kujitegemea'. In both countries and elsewhere in Africa it means the same thing. If we are to progress as a nation, we must free ourselves from dependence on external aid. For Botswana this means in the first instance freedom from the need to seek aid for our annual budget. We shall of course, even after the date of financial self-sufficiency which is expected to be 1972-3, still need development aid and technical assistance from other countries. But we can only accept this aid with a good conscience and with self-respect if we make the maximum use of all our own resources, not least our human resources.

If we are to be free to determine our own social and political philosophy, we must depend on our own efforts. Only if we ourselves exert all our efforts to build Botswana, will Botswana be built in the way we wish it to be built. This means that we must only accept aid which comes without political strings or unacceptable economic conditions. It also means that we must be satisfied that expatriates who come to work among us, wherever they come from, must a least respect our national principles. In fact I believe that many of those who come to Botswana from other countries, especially young people, do so because they identify with our aspirations and wish to help us to succeed in our struggle to assert the principles of human dignity.

For Self-reliance does not mean that the Batswana must work in isolation. We must not only seek to strengthen our links with rich countries who can provide aid and investment. We must strengthen our links with our brother African countries who face the same problems as ourselves. Despite the difficulties which Botswana faces in such co-operation with independent Africa we are determined to extend trading and other links. This is why we are seeking to build a road from Nata to Kazungula, because it will open up new possibilities of trade with Zambia as well as contributing to the development of Northern Botswana. This is why we are anxious to retain a regional university serving Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, while ensuring that it is responsive to our development needs. This is why we are anxious to send our students and trainees where necessary to institutions elsewhere in Africa. We recognise that we have common problems and common interests with developing countries in Africa and further afield, and we are determined to find practical ways of increasing our co-operation with them.

Africa needs to seek aid from the developed countries. But we must demonstrate to donor-nations that we shall not be seeking aid for ever. We are seeking only that aid and Investment from abroad which will enable us to stand on our own feet. For Botswana it is essential that we accept aid only from countries which seek to sustain our independence and support us in the stand we have taken. Self-reliance for Botswana and for Africa also means, as I stressed when I spoke of development, that we should be united in our efforts to achieve a world economic system which will permit all developing countries to rely on their efforts and not to remain for ever at the mercy of the wealthy nations and dependent on international charity.

WORLD UNITY

But **unity** among the poor of the world is not enough. We must, however distant the prospect may appear, work for a united world. This does not of course mean that the whole world must embrace a single political or social philosophy. As I have often stresed to you, unity in Botswana must, if it is to be enduring, be based on recognition of the fact that we are a nation made up of different races and tribes. I have also argued that there must be room for different political views, providing our fundamental principles are not undermined. In the same way within Africa and within the world as a whole there must be room for diversity in political viewpoints. President Nyerere has argued this most eloquently in his speeches. He said in a speech on African unity in Cairo that 'differences in ideology must not preclude unity. There are and will be, socialists and non-socialists, democrats and non-democrats in Africa'. The circumstances and hence the policies of African countries will vary widely, but unity will exist, providing there is mutual respect, and providing that fundamental principles of human dignity are not cast aside or trampled underfoot.

World Unity is a distant prospect, but Botswana in common with other African nations will make progress towards this ultimate goal if it makes clear its conviction that differences in ideology must not be allowed to plunge the world into chaos and war. And this is why Botswana is non-aligned. We are non-aligned because we are determined to develop our own social and political philosophy and system to suit our own needs. But we are also non-aligned because we owe no automatic allegiance to either of the major power blocs. We have traditional ties with Britain which is a member of a military alliance of Western countries. We intend to maintain these links for many reasons, not least because Britain is a country which gives aid of a kind we need and in a way which is wholly acceptable to us. Britain in short is one of those countries which are seeking to sustain our independence at a critical stage in our development. But these links with Britain and with other western countries do not prevent us from establishing relations with other friendly countries, including Communist countries.

Botswana's objective is to diversify its external relations to the greatest possible extent. We will work together with all nations in the cause of attaining a world which is not divided between rich and poor, or black and white. And in our efforts to achieve a greater degree of world unity we will lay great emphasis on our membership of those institutions which, in a practical way, bridge the gulf between rich and poor and which bring together nations of different racial composition. That is why we regard ourselves as one of the non-aligned nations of the world. That is why the Commonwealth remains for us an important international institution which must be sreserved and developed. For this once again is an international grouping which cuts across barriers of race and ideology.

But let us return from these long-terms aspirations to the immediate problems confronting us in our region. How do we apply our principles to the area which concerns us most directly? For we must never forget that we are part of Southern Africa. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we clearly define our relationship with the Republic of South Africa. We cannot obliterate the harsh facts of history and geography. We are members of the Southern African Customs Union and the Rand Currency Area. We are of course prepared to co-operate in regional arrangements for disease and pest control. Such plagues know no frontiers, and the breakdown of such long-standing arrangements would be damaging and wasteful—and would have repercussions which would be felt outside our immediate region. We rely on the Southern African transport system for both imports and exports. We need to attract private investment from South African sources. We welcome private investment in Botswana from any source which seeks to build in partnership with the people of this country and not simply to drain us of our resources with little or no return to our economy. We wish to attract South Africans as tourists, providing they are prepared to accept that in Botswana they must respect our nonracial principles.

But Botswana's dependence on South Africa is great enough already. We have noted South Africa's offers to assist independent African states with their development. We have noted South Africa's assurances of friendly intentions towards Botswana and other independent states. We have recently together with Lesotho and Swaziland concluded lengthy negotiations with South Africa on the Customs Agreement. These have resulted in a more equitable distribution of the revenues of the Customs Area, and the right to protect our infant industries while retaining access to the South African market. But in these negotiations we have not been seeking aid. Nor do we intend to seek aid from South African official sources. It would not be in the interests of either country to increase Botswana's dependence on South Africa. Instead our aim has been and remains to convert the almost total dependence of the colonial period into a pattern of interdependence.

APARTHEID: NO COMPROMISE

We recognise that there is very little Botswana can do to produce a change of heart among South Africa's white population other than by force of persuasion or example. Yet we are determined that no word or deed on Botswana's part will give comfort to the advocates of race supremacy. We have unequivocally condemned the theory and practice of apartheid and in particular the extension of the full apparatus of apartheid to the international trust territory of Namibia or South West Africa. Nevertheless we do not attempt to conceal that for obvious reasons Botswana must maintain diplomatic contacts with South Africa. For equally obvious reasons, as I have made clear ever since Independence, we decline to consider the exchange of diplomatic representatives with South Africa until we are confident that South Africa can fully guarantee that Botswana's representatives will in all respects, at all times and in all places be treated in the same way as diplomats from other countries. When I am obliged to go through South Africa I am treated with the respect due to the head of an independent state, nor have my ministers or civil servants any cause for complaint when they visit South Africa for essential negotiations or transit South Africa en route for other destinations. But I know that most Batswana who visit South Africa are treated like black South Africans. Since I refuse to accept that all Batswana are not intrinisically equal this presents obvious difficulties.

Human dignity is indivisible and we are not prepared to compromise our non-racial principles. I am confident that our position is respected by our powerful neighbour to the South. They do not like what we have to say about apartheid, just as we do not like what they have to say about non-racialism.

We have, I think, demonstrated an important principle. As I told Parliament we have shown that it is possible for two countries which are far from equal in respect of population, wealth, resources and sheer power, and whose economies are closely linked but whose fundamental principles could hardly differ more markedly, to co-exist.

Yet it cannot be denied that there is a cloud hanging over Southern Africa. The economic prospects of our region could be limitless were it not for the threat posed by racialism and minority rule and the instability and potential instability to which it must give rise. Botswana endorses as do all independent African states and all but a handful of United Nations members the Lusaka Manifesto. The Lusaka Manifesto, drawn up a year ago by the heads of state of East and Central Africa, firmly states Africa's preference for the achievement of self-determination through negotiation. It was in this way that Botswana's independence was achieved and we would wish that the indigenous populations of neighbouring territories could share our experience. Yet the usaka Manifesto, although widely proclaimed throughout the world as a moderate and realistic statement has gone unheeded. The consequences of this refusal to consider even the possibility of change in the region will be serious indeed.

RHODESIA AND PORTUGAL

Botswana has, for instance, repeatedly drawn attention to the dangerous consequences of the refusal of Rhodesia's whites to envisage the possibility of peaceful progress to majority rule. The declaration of the illegal Republic is further evidence of the determiniation of Rhodesia's 250,000 whites to hold down, by force, an African population already approaching five million, and growing rapidly. This obstinacy poses a threat to the stability of the entire region.

We have similarly expressed our opposition to Portugal's unyielding refusal to permit any progress towards self-determination in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). Our criticism of Portugal as of Rhodesia is not based on an argument about the timing of a programme of progress towards majority rule, but on their blank refusal to consider even that possibility. This obduracy leaves the populations of these two countries little alternative but to resort to violence.

But Botswana cannot allow itself to be used as a springboard for violence against the minority regimes. Our task is to insulate ourselves from the instability their policies provoke. We must preserve our independence while asserting the principles of human freedom and dignity. I should like at the same time to explain Botswana's position on the recent Security Council Resolution on Rhodesia. It must be obvious that while we share the concern over the Rhodesian situation expressed in the Finnish resolution, it will not be possible for us to comply with all the sanctions it calls for All of you are only too aware that the only railway linking South Africa and Rhodesia goes through Botswana. As I have repeatedly made clear, Botswana has no intention of interfering with that line, on which we depend for the vital imports and exports essential to our development. Nor can we cut off road communications with Rhodesia. Even the reduction of trade with Rhodesia presents great difficulties, because of Rhodesia's capacity to retaliate. An alternative link with South Africa via Beitbridge could be built relatively quickly and cheaply, and this would leave the future of the Botswana line at best uncertain.

Yet Botswana has not ignored the United Nations call for sanctions against the Rhodesian regime. Indeed we have supported this policy as the only alternative to conceding defeat. We have called upon members states, who are in a better position to assist in this matter than ourselves, to cooperate in making sanctions more effective. And we ourselves have done all we can within the constraints of our land-locked position, our frail economy and the administrative problems involved. We have prevented the Rhodesians from using their railway to import arms and military supplies. Our airline has long ceased to fly into Rhodesia. We have prevented the import of Rhodesian beer and tobacco. We are determined where possible to limit our independence on Rhodesia. More than a year ago I called for the withdrawal of South African Security forces from Rhodesia.

But this must be the limit of our contribution. And how much more difficult would our positions have been in face of the earlier unsuccessful resolution which called for sanctions to be extended to include South Africa! We respect the genuine concern with prompts these resolutions but we cannot comply with them. Nor did I believe that Africa or the world expects us to. And here let me recall with gratitude the understanding expressed by Tanzania's President. President Nyerere, referring to Botswana's inability to implement calls for the complete trade boycott of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, in the course of a statement on foreign policy he made to a TANU Conference at Mwanza in 1967, said:

'We can ask that they should do everything possible to assert the principle of human dignity. But we should not ask them to commit suicide'

OUR TASK IS TO SURVIVE

We in Botswana read these words with gratitude. Here is evidence that one of the most highly respected of African leaders understands our position. And we know that he is not alone Our task is to survive amidst the dangers which surround us as in island of sanity and dignity, surrounded by the advocates of racial supremacy and minority rule. And this is the task of all the majority-ruled states in our region. We must preserve our independence and the values that this independence symbolises. This independence can be safeguarded only by our continued stable development. And the same is true of Swaziland and Lesotho. This is why we have expressed our concern at recent developments in Lesotho. Stable development in the situation in which all three countries find themselves, which is not of our choosing, depends on the undivided support of our people for the policies our respective governments pursue. We have made it clear that we have no wish to interfere in the internal policies of a fellow member of the Organisation of African Unity but we have expressed the hope that the people of Lesotho may find it possible to make the speediest possible return to democracy and consitutional government on a generally acceptable basis with the minimum of external interference from whatever quarter.

So far as Botswana is concerned our commitment to democracy and development is not in doubt. We are a united people, fully equipped to meet the challenges of the future. The Vice-President when he addresses the Conference tomorrow will be discussing the application of all our national principles to the development tasks ahead. He will be explaining to you the kind of problems these will raise and will be urging you to discuss fully the choices which face us in responding to this challenge. It only remains for me, in conclusion, to emphasize one of these principles, unity. We shall suceed if we remain a united nation. And unity will be preserved if we avoid unnecessary divisions. We must fight against all the forces which could divide us as a nation. One such danger might stem from differences in tribe or race. This for Botswana, I am confident, is not a problem. But there is one other source of weakness which we must equally avoid. And that is the social divisions to which development could give rise if we do not take care to avoid the unequal distribution of the benefits of development which has been a feature of economic growth elsewhere. We do not wish to place any artificial obstacles in the way of the initative and energy of our people. But equally we must avoid divisions based on occupation or inequality of wealth. We must avoid creating a divided society in which the weakest go to the wall. I am relying on this Conference to give serious thought to these matters so that the united social fabric which guarantee of our independence is dependence is preserved. Only in this way will Botswana continue as an influence for good in Africa and in the wider world.

MY ROAD TO LENINISM

Ho Chi Minh

There are many roads to Leninism. For the exploited worker under capitalism it is usually the hard lessons of the daily class struggle which teach him that scientific socialism alone is the answer. The philosopher, economist, historian may become convinced of the truth of Communism through the sheer force of reason, the overwhelming truth, proved by experience, of the concepts of Marxism-Leninism. For millions of oppressed peoples victims of colonialism and racialism, it is that Marxism-Leninism is the only correct revolutionary theory which can emancipate their people. 'It was my patriotism and not my communism that led me to Lenin,' declared the late Ho Chi Minh, one of the greatest and most revered revolutionaries of our time, in this remarkable article first written on the occasion of the 90th Anniversary of Lenin's birth.

After the First World War I made a living as a retoucher at a photographer's and as an artist in a shop dealing in old Chinese paintings. The rest of my time I spent distributing leaflets condemning the French colonialists' crimes in Vietnam.

At that time I welcomed the October Revolution only instinctively. I had yet to realise the tremendous historic importance of the event. I admired Lenin as a great patriot who had liberated his country, but I had not yet read him.

I joined the French Socialist Party because those "ladies and gentlemen", as members used to address each other, said they were sympathetic to me and the fight of subjugated peoples. I knew nothing about party or trade union organisation, nor did I know what socialism or communism stands for.

In those days the branch organisations of the Socialist Party were engaged in a lively debate on whether the Party should remain in the Second International, found a '2½ International' or join Lenin's Third International. Twice or three times a week I attended. I did not understand everything at first. I wondered why discussion was so heated. My impression was that one could carry out the revolution equally well with the Second, '2½' or Third International. I wondered about the reason for the controversies. Just what had become of the First International?

What interested me above all else and what nobody ever spoke about in specific terms at those meetings was: which of the Internationals was willing to champion the cause of the subjugated peoples?

I asked that question—the most important in my view—at one of the meetings Some comrades replied: 'The Third International, but not the Second' One of them lent me Lenin's 'Theses on the National Question' published in **Humanité.**

I found Lenin's terminology difficult but after re-reading him I grasped the more important propositions. The élan, the enthusiasm, the confidence they aroused in me! The insight I gained into all interconnections! I was stunned, and I exclaimed as if addressing a large audience: 'Why, comrades, this is just what we need, it shows us the way to liberation!'

From then on I always believed in Lenin and the Third International.

Formerly I had closely followed discussion in branch organisations but had never been able to tell right from wrong. But now I took an active part in the debates. True, my French did not yet enable me fully to express my ideas, but I emphatically rejected all accusations against Lenin and the Third International. My constant argument was: 'Since you don't condemn colonialism nor declare in support of the subjugated peoples, what are the aims of your revolution?'

I did not attend branch meetings in my district alone but stated my 'position' at meetings elsewhere. I take this opportunity to thank Marcel Cachin, Vaillant-Couturier, Monmousseau and many other comrades for their help in extending my knowledge. Finally, at the Tours congress, I voted with them for joining the Third International.

Initially it was my patriotism and not my communism that led me to Lenin and the Third International. Afterwards, as I carefully studied Marxism-Leninism, gaining practical experience at the same time, I came step by step to the conclusion that socialism and communism alone can free the subjugated nations and working people all over the world from slavery

The Vietnamese and Chinese have a legend about the miraculous 'book of wisdom'. It says that anyone who encounters a big difficulty on his path has only to open that book to find a way out. Leninism is something more than a miraculous 'book of wisdom', it is a guide for us Vietnamese revolutionaries and our people. Leninism is a shining sun illuminating our road to victory, our road to socialism and communism.

LENIN THE LIBERATOR

Recently the underground organisation of the South African Communist Party carried out a nationwide, illegal distribution of educational material among the working people of this country where the Party has now been outlawed since 1950. Among the materials circulated was a special miniaturised edition of this journal, containing the Party's Programme, The Road to South African Freedom *and other important articles. In addition a leaflet,* Lenin the Liberator, *commemorated the centenary of his birth. The full text is reprinted here.*

This year, all over the world, men and women who love human freedom are celebrating the centenary of the birth of one of the greatest of men. Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin was born in Russia on April 22, 1870. The Russia into which he was born was a land of suffering, backwardness and oppression. Over this huge country—the biggest in the world—the tsar (the emperor) ruled by terror and absolute decree. The masses of peasants and workers had no votes, no say in making the laws under which they lived. They were starving and mostly illiterate. Opposition parties and trade unions were banned and leaders who fought for the people's rights were arrested tortured, exiled and killed by the political police. The non-Russian peoples of the tsarist empire were nationally oppressed insulted and degraded. In many ways it was just like South Africa today.

Tsarist Russia was known and hated for its oppression. Its government was called "the policeman of Europe" But there was another Russia—one which longed and struggled for freedom. All the best and bravest among the working people and the intellectuals thought only of revolution. One of these was Lenin. His elder brother, Alexander, was executed for taking part in a plot to assassinate the Tsar. This incident made a profound impression on the young Lenin. He thought deeply about the problem of how to bring about a revolution. To kill a bad leader is not by itself good enough. He could be replaced by one even worse—as Verwoerd was replaced by Vorster.

If the masses of people were to overthrow oppression, Lenin realised, they had to be guided by a correct revolutionary theory. This theory existed in the teachings of the great German socialist Karl Marx and his life long comrade Frederich Engels Marx showed that all progress in history came about though the struggle of classes. In modern society the most advanced class was the working class. Together with the masses of poor people in the countryside, the workers could defeat the rich—the owners of factories, mines and big farms—take power into their own hands, and build a new and better society, socialism.

But to do this the workers must organise; they must build their own revolutionary party; they must fight by every possible means including if necessary armed struggle for liberation.

Lenin developed Marx's brilliant ideas and applied them to the actual situation in Russia and the world. He built up the Russian Bolshevik (Communist) Party. As the tsarist dictatorship would not allow this to be done legally, the Party had to work "underground", in secret. Many brave communists suffered imprisonment torture, exile and death. Lenin himself was forced to live abroad for many years of exile. The tsarist government and its secret police, together with an army of spies and informers did their utmost to supress the ideas of Lenin, of communism. But truth cannot be destroyed. The triumph of Lenin and his comrades came with the Great Socialist Revolution in Russia on November 7, 1917. The workers and peasants formed their own government. They took over from the capitalists and landlords the factories, mines and big farms, and developed them for the benefit of the people. The old tsarist empire was transformed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—a family of free and equal socialist nations. Exploitation of many by man was abolished. From being the most backward, economically and politically, Russia became the most advanced of countries.

Lenin was the great champion of the oppressed peoples of the world. All his life he hated and fought ideas and practices of racialism, such as those of Hitler and Vorster, which claim that one race is superior to others and entitled to privileges. That is one great reason why the memory of Lenin is dear to hundreds of millions of people, whether they are communists or not especially in Africa and Asia who have suffered because of their nationality or colour.

All over the world, new parties grew up, Communist and Workers Parties, who upheld and put into practice the theories of Marxism-Leninism. Some of these Parties in a number of countries of Europe and Asia and in Cuba, have led the workers and peasants to conquer state power and are following Lenin's path to socialism.

These countries, together with the revolutionary working class led by Communist Parties in the developed capitalist countries, are the strongest friends and allies of the national liberation movements of Africa and Asia It is largely because of such powerful friends that most of the peoples of these continents have been able to end colonial rule and win independence. This is a part of the debt we all owe to the memory of Lenin, the Liberator.

In South Africa for many years the truth about Lenin's teachings was brought to the people by the Communist Party.

Like the tsarist government of old Russia, the white rulers of South Africa fear the truth. For twenty years the Communist Party has been illegal. It is a crime even to advocate Lenin's ideas.

Hundreds of brave South African Communists, men like Bram Fischer, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, have been sentenced to life imprisonment and other harsh sentences, banned, exiled, even murdered by Vorster's fascist dictatorship.

They can kill Communists, but they cannot kill Communism.

The South African Communist Party is carrying on, and will do so until victory Today the main struggle in our country is to overthrow the tyranny of white domination, to win the national democratic revolution for the liberation of the African and other oppressed peoples. The Communist Party, following Lenin's ideas, is in the front ranks of the struggle. Its members will be found together with other members of the African National Congress and its allies, in the ranks of the liberation army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, which has mauled the enemy in Rhodesia and will soon do so in the Republic as well The Party calls upon the workers to unite to educate, organise and inspire the people for struggle.

Whatever Vorster and his Nazi thugs may do or try, the Communist Party will survive and in the end be victorious because its ideas are true, human and in accordance with the needs of the great majority of our people.

Lenin is dead but his ideas will never die.

His books will be read: our revolutionary youth will find their way to read Lenin.

His memory inspires us as we struggle for a free South Africa.

Who do Vorster and his bullies think they are to imagine they can "suppress" Leninism? They can no more stop these ideas than they can prevent the sun from rising in the morning.

Lenin's ideas inspire the 1,000 million people of the socialist countries—one third of mankind.

They inspire the workers of Europe, America, Asia and Africa.

They inspire the heroic people of Vietnam who—though a small nation—have already beaten one big imperialist country, France, and will soon defeat the biggest of all, the United States of America.

Lenin was more than a great thinker: he was a man of action, a fighter. His ideas are weapons in the fight for freedom. Let us honour Lenin by fighting even harder for a free South Africa, where all men are equals and the land and its wealth restored to be people.

Lenin's ideas cannot be kept out by laws and police Our South African people too will come to Leninism for the truth is mighty and will prevail.

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